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1. Introduction and Aim of the Study 
Avian Influenza (AI) viruses pose a threat to human and animal health and are 
responsible for potential economic losses. From the waterfowl reservoir, these 
RNA viruses can be transmitted to domestic poultry and humans, causing illness 
and death among people as well as mass culling of farm birds worldwide.  
 
This study contributes to increasing the knowledge by evaluating a promising 
poxvirus-based vector vaccine that carries and expresses an artificial, 
computationally derived hemagglutinin sequence in order to induce immunity 
against low pathogenic avian influenza H9N2.  
 
Modified Vaccinia virus Ankara (MVA) based vaccines have been tested in 
multiple human and animal trials and proved to be a safe and reliable vector 
system. The ancestral strategy uses a hemagglutinin sequence located at the node 
of a phylogenetic tree which arranges virus strains according to their evolutionary 
relationship. Inactivated whole virus vaccines engineered this way have conferred 
cross-clade protection in the ferret model of influenza A virus infections. In the 
present study, we aimed at testing the ancestral H9N2 MVA vaccine in the chicken 
model. 
 
Hereby, we tried to find answers to the following questions: What levels of H9 
specific antibody responses are induced in chicken? Do the antibodies elicited by 
the ancestral H9 antigen cross-react with H9 antigens from other virus strains?  Do 






2. Review of Literature 
2.1 Influenza A Virus  
The Orthomyxoviridae family consists of five genera: Influenza A virus is the most 
widespread genus, infecting a multitude of mammalian and avian species whereas 
the genera B and C are mostly found in humans. The Isavirus group (fish 
pathogen) and the Thogotoviruses (tick-borne arbovirus) should be mentioned to 
complete this overview.  
2.1.1 Viral Classification and Structure 
Avian Influenza (AI) viruses are enveloped negative-sense, segmented RNA 
viruses whose genomes encode for at least 16 different proteins. Usually, these 
proteins are divided into three groups; virus core proteins, matrix layer 
components, and envelope proteins. The latter, notably the hemagglutinin (HA) 
and neuraminidase (NA) proteins, key players in cell adhesion and detachment, 
help to classify  
 
Figure 1: An avian influenza virus in schematic section: The eight gene segments are 
represented in the center and the orange and blue spikes on the viral membrane represent HA 
and NA proteins. 
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influenza A viruses. In birds, there are 16 HA subtypes (H1-H16) and 9 different 
NA (NA1-9), thus 144 possible combinations of which many could have been 
found in the field [1-3]. The terms HA and NA also refer to the gene segments that 
encode for the HA and NA proteins.  
Whereas clinical isolates often appear as filamentous particles (up to several 
microns in length), laboratory passaged viruses mostly show a spherical phenotype 
of 80 to 120nm [1].  
AI viruses contain eight gene segments of different sizes, named for the major 
protein they encode (HA, NA, PB1, PB2…) as shown in the image above. Briefly, 
the most important viral proteins and their major functions will be presented. 
2.1.2 Major Influenza A Virus Proteins 
Envelope.Proteins–.[1] –.Hemagglutinin.(HA)  
HA is an envelope protein that covers approximately 80% of the outer surface of a 
virus particle. This homotrimer plays a crucial role in cell fusion and intrusion as it 
has a high level of specificity for binding to sialic acids on the host cell surface. 
After endocytosis into the cytoplasm, which is a common method for material to 
enter the cell, the endosome is transformed into a lysosome by acidification. 
Triggered by this pH change, the HA molecule splits into two subunits (HA1 and 
HA2) and plants the fusion peptide, a part of HA2, into the endosome‟s membrane. 
The viral and host cell membranes merge and ribo nucleo proteins (RNP) leave the 
virion, heading towards the nucleus. However, the splitting of HA molecules works 
only when the HA had been cleaved by cellular enzymes during the virus‟ prior 
assembly, when leaving the former host cell. Since only certain tissues are 
equipped with adequate proteases, only those tissues can produce infectious 
particles. In humans, influenza viruses are specific to the upper respiratory tract 
due to the local cells that synthetize the suitable enzymes to cleave the precursor 
HA molecule. In contrast, highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAI) 
display cleavage sites composed of multiple basic amino acids, making them 
accessible for furin or other ubiquitous proteases that can be found in most cells of 
the body. This implies that infectious HPAI virus is produced in many different 
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tissues, including skeletal muscle, pancreas, heart, intestines, kidney and brain; 
thus harming essential organs and causing severe symptoms. 
[2].–.Neuramindase.(NA) 
Being four times less numerous than HA, the highly conserved neuraminidase 
(NA) covers about 17% of the viral surface and rises out of the lipid particle 
membrane like a mushroom among the hemagglutinins. With its tetrameric shape, 
this enzyme catalyzes the cleavage of sialic acids from cellular glycan structures as 
glycolipids and glycoproteins which is imperative both for viral spread and for the 
release of viral progeny. Although HA binds to sialic acids (also called neuraminic 
acids) to invade the host cell membrane, recently produced viruses need to be 
released in order to infect surrounding cells. Therefore, both surface proteins act in 
concert [4] to first attach and penetrate, then to detach from the host cell. NA helps 
the virus spread in respiratory mucosal membrane by cleaving sialic acid residues 
from the mucins of the respiratory tract and helps to avoid viral clustering. 
Moreover, NA may also be able to strengthen HA‟s hemagglutinating activity as it 
removes sialic acids from oligosaccharides that are found in close vicinity to the 
binding site of HA [5]. 
[3].–.M2 
M2 is a transmembrane protein which provides passage for protons during early 
and late stages of virus replication. This minor component (approx. 20 
molecules/particle) is activated by the low pH (~6) in the lysosome where it opens 
its „tryptophan-gates‟ [6] and conducts protons through the viral envelope into its 
interior, where the pH decreases to ~5. As mentioned above, this step is crucial for 
the conformational change of HA before membrane confluence can occur. It is 
believed that the pH drop enables the dissociation of the matrix protein (M1) from 
the viral nucleoproteins to enable them to be transported into the nucleus for 
mRNA production. Furthermore, M2 proton channel proteins in the membrane of 
the trans-Golgi network equilibrate cellular and Golgi lumen pH preventing 
precocious cleavage of HA on their way to the host cell surface [7].    
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Matrix.Layer.–.[4] –;Matrix.Protein.M1  
Right underneath the lipid bilayer that forms the envelope, the most abundant virus 
protein M1 is arranged as a helical net structure, providing support and structure 
for the viral envelope [8]. It links the cytoplasmatical tails of HA, NA and M2 on 
the outer side to viral RNA (vRNA) and nucleoproteins in the form of the 
ribonucleoprotein (RNP) on the inner side. RNP can only be transported to the 
nucleus when released by M1 [9]. Subsequently, M1 is involved in the transport of 
RNP to the cell surface as well as in transcription and replication of vRNA. It 
might be involved in virus budding and design of progeny as it may influence 
membrane curvature in budding processes and therefore determine if newly 
produced virions are filamentous or spherical [8, 9]. To what extend M1 
collaborates with HA, the initiator of budding, and if it mediates the recruitment of 
proteins to finish viral assembly remains to be investigated. 
Virus.Core.–.[5,6,7] –.Polymerase.Complex.PB1,.PB2,.PA  
Consisting of three non-congruent proteins PB1, PB2, and PA, the viral RNA-
dependent RNA-polymerase replicates the viral genome and transcribes messenger 
RNA in the nucleus of an infected cell. It is highly host cell specific but has no 
proofreading activity, resulting in frequent errors in the new nucleotide sequence 
and in production of viral mutants on a regular base. Together with the 
nucleoprotein (NP) and the vRNA, the polymerase forms the ribonucleoprotein 
RNP, the major functional unit of the viral core. The replication works via an 
intermediate step, a positive-sense complementary RNA (cRNA) which then is 
transformed into the negative-sense vRNA. Transcribed mRNA, however, requires 
several modifications: PB1 cleaves an oligonucleotide sequence from the 5‟-head 
of a host cell precursor mRNA and uses it as primer to induce transcription of 
vRNA, a process called “cap-snatching”. In addition to the cap, the polymerase 
creates a poly(A) sequence as a tail and therefore finishes the new mRNA that 
resembles the one which occurs naturally in the host cell: positive-sense, capped, 
polyadenylated [10].  
[8].–.Nucleoprotein.(NP) 
Shaped like a banana, nucleoproteins bind both individually and clustered to the 
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phosphate backbone of viral RNA as well as to PB1 and PB2 of the polymerase 
complex. Primarily, it is a structural RNA-binding protein but it interacts with 
cellular molecules as well. There is little or no specificity to nucleotide sequences 
but a high affinity to RNA strands, making the three of them constant companions 
during the viral life and replication cycle. One of the major tasks of NP is to hold 
the RNA in a convenient position for the polymerase to work correctly or for 
packing new virions. NP-cell-interactions are very diverse; although underlying 
mechanisms have not been described, NP collaborates with the nuclear import and 
export apparatus, it binds to actin filaments and to nuclear RNA helicase [11].  
[9].–.Nonstructural Protein 1 (NS1)  
The NS1 protein is involved in the suppression of the host immune response that 
eliminates the virus. It prevents polyadenylation of cellular mRNA. This means 
that there are fewer mature, functional RNA molecules that can be translated into 
proteins [12]. Typical targets of NS1 are mRNAs that serve as a basis for interferon 
production. It is possible that the virulence changes dramatically through a single 
point mutation in the nucleotide sequence of NS1 genes as shown for a HPAI 
H5N1 virus that completely lost its NS1 characteristics by replacing glutamic acid 
with aspartic acid at position 92 [13].  
[10].–.Nuclear Export Protein – NEP (also referred to as NS2)  
Formerly, the Nuclear Export Protein (NEP) was thought to be crucial only for the 
export of new RNP complexes. These complexes are formed in infected host cell 
nuclei and then transported to the periphery where they merge with the cell 
membrane to be released as viral progeny. However, there has been proven 
evidence that NEP interferes with a cellular ATPase and, by doing so, contributes 
to the viral budding process. The NEP also regulates the amount of vRNA and 
mRNA that accumulates in the cell. Similar to one of the effects of NS1, NEP can 
influence the degree of pathogenicity of a virus particle as it has an impact on the 
balance of replication and translation [14]. 
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2.1.3 Viral Reproduction Cycle 
AI viruses need live cells to replicate. Figure 2 shows briefly, which steps lay 
between the first attachment and the release of viral progeny. Matsuoka et al 
published a much more detailed map of the AI virus life cycle, indicating how 
complex viral reproduction is in reality [15]. 
 
Figure 2: The life cycle of AI viruses [16]: 1. Attachment to host cell receptor (sialic acid),  
2. Endocytosis, 3. Fusion with endosomal membrane and uncoating, 4. Replication of the 
genome, 5. Budding and release of viral progeny 
2.1.4 Receptors and Host Spectrum 
The HA molecule is thought to be the main mediator of host specificity, and binds, 
according to the subtype, to its suitable of receptor on the cell surface [17]. These 
receptors are oligosaccharides exhibiting terminal sialic acids, either linked by 
α2,6-linkages or α2,3-linkages to galactose. While human influenza viruses are 
prone to attach to Siaα2,6Gal constellations, AI viruses prefer Siaα2,3Gal linkages. 
In the human upper respiratory tract, notably in the trachea, there are mostly α2,6-
linked receptors and very few of α2,3 ones. However, in duck intestines where AI 
viruses replicate, a large amount of the latter is found.   
Sporadically, AI viruses overcome the species barrier and infect people like in 
human cases of H5N1 (Egypt, Indonesia, Vietnam and others) and H9N2 
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(Hongkong). The pandemic strains of the 20th century (1918 H1N1; 1957 H2N2; 
1968 H3N2) exhibited human-type receptor-binding specificity with HA molecules 
that originated from avian subtypes. This and the fact that HPAI H5N1 viruses that 
circulate in the Middle East, Europe and Africa have acquired a limited ability to 
attach to human α2,6-linked receptors suggest that the next pandemic might be set 
off by a H5N1 or H9N2 strain. 
 
Figure 3: (a) Difference of linkage between the galactose and the sialic acid on cell surface 
receptors, determining the respective susceptibility either for human or avian influenza viruses. 
(b) Incubation of human trachea tissue sections with human or avian influenza virus and 
subsequent staining with antibodies and secondary fluorescent antibodies. Left image: The 
bright plating indicates virus binding [17]. 
2.1.5 Evolution of Avian Influenza Viruses – Antigenic Drift and Antigenic Shift 
A characteristic of influenza viruses and one of the reasons why antiviral drug and 
vaccine development is very challenging is antigenic drift and shift. The viral 
polymerase complex has no proofreading activity and single point mutations in 
messenger RNA molecules occur frequently. This leads to slight alterations in the 
primary structure of one or more viral proteins and can cause substantial changes 
in the pathogenicity of a particle (antigenic drift). It is believed that LPAI viruses 
that have been introduced from wild birds into domestic poultry underwent 
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mutations in the hemagglutinin (HA) cleavage site. By doing so, HPAI viruses of 
the H5N1 subtype arose in domestic birds [16].  
Antigenic shift denotes the exchange of whole gene segments between two viruses. 
This happens when an individual host cell gets infected by two identical or two 
different viruses at the same time and seems to happen preferentially in swine and 
ducks. Researchers assume that most human pandemic viruses arose this way. The 
first pandemic of the twenty-first century, a H1N1 from swine origin that killed 
more than 18,000 people and spread to 214 countries within a year [16], serves as 
an example of a virus that caught the world off-guard.  
To what extend this novel pathogen affects humans (seasonal or pandemic 
characteristics, disease patterns, morbidity, and mortality) or if it doesn´t overcome 
pre-existing immunity is hard to predict. This demonstrates how dangerous and 
unpredictable newly-formed avian influenza viruses can be.  
A way to respond viruses that circulate is annual vaccination of people. 
Researchers try to foresee which strain or strains might threaten the population 
during the upcoming flu season and adjust a vaccine correspondingly. There are 
even trivalent or quadrivalent influenza vaccines as a simultaneous protection 
against several strains seems to be appropriate. To what extend such yearly 
vaccines benefit public health is not always easy to assess since numerous studies 
are conducted in different conditions such as period of the year, geographical area, 
test persons and vaccine preparations. However, the conclusion has been drawn 
that annual flu vaccines can reduce the overall incidence of disease by about 60% 
[18].   
If a newly designed vaccine protects from an infection by a field strain mainly 
depends on two aspects: 1) profile of the patient (age, state of health) and 2) how 
well the antibodies that are induced by the vaccine match the real pathogen. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of flu vaccines will continue to vary each year.  
Besides, an easy way to lower the incidence of flu illness are strict hygiene habits 
such as covering your sneezes and coughs, the usage of paper instead of cotton 
handkerchiefs and regularly washing your hands with soap [18]. 
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2.1.6 Clinical Signs in Birds 
Clinical signs displayed by birds that are infected with avian influenza viruses can 
differ considerably. Factors influencing the course of the disease are the strain 
(Low/High Pathogenicity AI but also subtype), host family and subfamily (for 
example turkey vs. chicken), gender, age, presence of secondary pathogens 
(respiratory or digestive tract pathogens), management conditions and the route of 
inoculation. 
In general, LPAI viruses create milder signs and cause less morbidity and mortality 
in infected flocks than HPAI strains. Physiological performances such as 
movement, vocalization, and egg production decrease only a little or not at all and 
postmortem examinations tend not to reveal prominent morphological changes. 
Non-specific symptoms like ruffled feathers and slight listlessness complicate the 
diagnostic in LPAI cases and require meticulous differential diagnostics. However, 
it has to be taken into consideration that LPAI viruses can cause severe symptoms 
and lead to death rates of 50% or higher, especially in young birds [19]. 
The clinical impact of LPAI in chickens will be discussed in more detail than HPAI 
infections as it is the object of this study.  
Mainly three organ systems are affected: the respiratory, digestive, and 
reproductive systems. The pathophysiological changes in either one, several, or all 
three of these systems may result in clinical signs. The most frequent clinical signs 
seen are reduced activity, huddling, raised plumage, lethargy, and a drop in feed 
and water consumption [19]. Birds whose respiratory tract is affected can display 
coughing, rattles, rales, and heavy lacrimation in some cases. One of the most 
common lesions is the inflammation of mucosal tissues in the sinus, beak, and 
trachea and results in discharges of different qualities. In case the exudate blocks 
the airways, the chicken may die from asphyxiation. Bronchopneumonia is rarely 
seen and is normally the result of co-infections with secondary pathogens such as 
Pasteurella multocida or Escherichia coli. In severe cases, infected birds show 
purulent air sacculitis.  
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Within the reproductive tract, the production of follicles stagnates or regresses and 
congestion of the ovaries occurs. Prior to death, the last eggs laid by the 
dysfunctional uterus and an inflamed salpinx (oviduct) may be fragile and 
malformed, with a loss of shell pigment and reduced calcium levels [19].   
 
HPAI viruses generally cause higher morbidity and mortality. By definition, these 
strains lead to very high mortality and can wipe out whole flocks within days 
without the appearance of clinical signs other than listlessness and agony. In order 
to estimate the pathogenicity of a field virus and for epidemic control decisions, the 
HA cleaveage site is sequenced. If this site within the HA gene consist of multiple 
basic amino acids, the virus is categorized as a HPAI virus. Clinical signs include 
nervous disorders like torticollis, opistotonus, and nystagmus; bile and urate 
stained droppings; cyanosis and hemorrhages causing discolorations on head, comb 
wattles, and shanks and precipitous decrease in egg production. Gross lesions 
include petechial stains in the epicardium, subcutaneous edema of head and neck, 
hemorrhagic pancreatitis, and splenic hyperplasia. Interestingly, respiratory 
disorders are less frequent and less prominent than in LPAI virus infections [19]. 
The clinical signs of AI can be very similar to other important diseases in poultry 
farming. Birds that are infected with the Newcastle Disease Virus (NDV) can show 
the same symptoms as AI. The disease is also named Pseudo Fowlpest. The 
Infectious Bronchitis Virus (IBV), a coronavirus, can cause respiratory signs, a 
decrease in egg production and is another differential diagnosis for AI. Another 
viral pathogen that leads to comparable clinical signs is the Gallid Herpesvirus 1 
(GaHV-1), which causes Infectious Laryngotracheitis (ILT). 
2.1.7 Approach to Epidemiological Processes using the example of HPAI H5N1 
Influenza A viruses are circulating in humans and animal populations throughout 
the world, causing seasonal infections every year and therefore represent a serious 
health and economic burden. In addition, they were proven responsible for millions 
of deaths as in the 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic [20, 21].  
Influenza A viruses do not try to live in symbiosis with their human hosts since 
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they induce cellular death by necrosis and apoptosis [19]. This is followed by a 
quick elimination by the immune system or a fatal end. The reservoir from where 
viruses find their way into humans on a regular base must be found in a different 
species. 
There is agreement that waterfowl are the natural source of all known subtypes [1-
3, 19, 22], notably birds from to the orders Charadriiformes (gulls and shorebirds) 
and Anseriformes (waterfowl), although AI viruses have been found in more than 
100 different bird and mammal species [1]. Areas where wild birds come into 
contact with domestic birds include farms situated in migratory flyways, or 
lakeshores where ducks are brought up feeding and resting with wild species. 
These areas allow viral transmission to poultry. In most cases, this transmission 
occurs by fecal-oral route via the water, sometimes termed “virus soup”. Good 
examples of wetland areas located in a pathway of ducks are Poyang and Dongting 
lakes in eastern China [1]. Even if interspecies transmission of avian influenza 
viruses to mammals is not an uncommon event, the wild bird - domestic poultry 
barrier is passed much more frequently [1]. Clinical signs in domestic turkeys, 
ducks, geese and chicken – among others – can range from listlessness and 
production losses to heavy organ disorders and sudden death, whereas no overt 
disease is seen in waterfowl and virus is shed predominantly in the feces [23]. In 
early fall, in the Northern Hemisphere the virus prevalence peaks in birds at the 
moment or right before southbound migration, reaching values of up to 50% of 
infected individuals. In winter and spring time, these values drop almost zero with 
some birds that maintain a subclinical infection [24].   
In highly pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 cases in humans, almost all 
confirmed 568 patients (as of 01/2015, WHO, 2003-15) had been in close contact 
to infected avian species before. Since 1997, the year of the first documented 
human HPAI case, ~59% of them succumbed to the H5N1 infection in 15 countries 
worldwide [16].  
Another fact that supports the assumption of viral introduction from aquatic birds 
into humans via poultry kept in captivity is that all human pandemic viruses of the 
twentieth century contained gene segments of contemporary avian viruses in the 
moment of their emergence, as shown by phylogenetic analyses [1].  
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One of the key elements to stem the spread of AI infections in poultry and humans 
is a constant and nationwide surveillance of outbreaks. By quickly deploying 
reliable systems, like PCR analyses, lineage characterizations, and animal models, 
vaccines, biosafety measures, and culling, AI viruses are hindered from becoming 
endemic to terrestrial poultry in Europe and Northern America. According to 
Webster et al. [1], several subtypes such as H6N1 and H9N2 persist in Chinese 
domestic birds, where they have established multiple lineages since the 1990‟s. 
Subsequent to the HPAI H5N1 outbreak at Qinghai Lake in central China in 2005, 
antigenically and genetically distinct clades circulate constantly as an endemic 
pathogen in domestic poultry in large parts of Southeast Asia.  
Fortunately, and maybe due to the strict disease control management, European 
and Northern American domestic bird populations do not perpetuate AI viruses 
although there have been outbreaks of both low and highly pathogenic AI in the 
past as well [1].  
Two Worldwide Superfamilies 
Krauss et al. [23] were the first to compare almost 250 different entire virus 
genomes from around the world and concluded that there are two „superfamilies‟ 
of AI viruses with little exchange of genetic material: the Eurasian family, 
including Australia and Africa and, the Americas family. According to their 
findings, gene segments of a given virus can be classified as belonging to one of 
the two groups; and inter-hemispheric transfer is uncommon despite overlapping 
pathways in northeastern Russia and Alaska. In both superfamilies almost all 
combinations of HxNy could be detected, although the rarely isolated H14 and 
H15 antigens seem to exist in Eurasia only. Beside the separation into two 
geographical groups, AI viruses are classified according to the antigenic properties 
of their most prominent surface protein HA. H1,2,5,6,11,13, and H16 belong to 
Group 1, the viruses that express H3,4,14,7,10 and H15 to the second group. 
Concerns about the ability of migratory birds to scatter virus over tremendous 
distances were vocalized after the reemergence of HPAI H5N1 influenza virus in 
poultry in Japan, South Korea and Thailand in the winter of 2006-2007 [23] after 
the outbreak at Qinghai Lake (mentioned above). Only a few years prior to that, a 
23 
 
successful eradication campaign had been carried out.  
In contrast, it should be noted that there is evidence that at least one of the HPAI 
H5N1 cases in Nigeria is due to importations of either frozen or live poultry. 
Furthermore, striking genetic similarity of a vaccine strain used in Central America 
and a japanese H5N2 isolate suggest that smuggled vaccine can cause long 
distances transmissions, in this case, since Japan bans the use of agricultural 
vaccines.  
Hence, the introduction of H5N1 highly pathogenic AI viruses from Europe or 
Asia to the Americas through waterfowl or migratory birds is not very probable 
and could be caused by illegal or poorly controlled shipments of infected livestock 
[23]. 
Concerning humans, the mechanisms of human-to-human transmission of both 
LPAI and HPAI viruses are of particular interest to researchers and citizens. 
During infections of domestic poultry flocks, isolation methods can be applied 
quickly and epidemic control procedures such as culling are common, it is 
frightening to imagine what highly contagious people would mean for daily life. 
The exact underlying mechanisms of how sneeze droplets, aerosols, handshakes 
and suchlike work as a transmission vector were subjected to new studies [1] 
which revealed that influenza is less transmissible than previously thought. 
Transmission normally occurs, apart from annual fluctuations, from November to 
May in temperate regions and in less distinct patterns in tropical zones as there are 
no seasons like in Europe or Northern America. Young children make up the 
largest part of all infected patients although increasing rates are found among 
young adults who have a close contact to their children [1].  
The suspicion that HPAI viruses can spread efficiently among humans has not been 
confirmed as there is no known case. Under laboratory condition in ferret models –
the virus behaves similar in ferrets and humans – there was no aerosol 
transmission, except when a genetically modified HPAI H5N1 virus was used [25]. 
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2.2 Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza H9N2 Virus 
2.2.1 Geographical Distribution and Prevalence in Birds 
H9N2 viruses are routinely found in wild birds and poultry, mostly in chicken, but 
also happen to infect mammals and humans. These LPAI viruses are widespread 
around the globe and were isolated in Germany, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, 
Sweden, Norway, France, Austria, Switzerland, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, 
South Africa, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Vietnam, Canada, in the USA, Argentina, New Zealand, the Middle East (Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt), in 
Libya, Tunisia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and China since the mid-1990s (as of 
11/2014) [26-29]. 
 
Figure 4: Incidence of LPAI H9N2 viruses as of 11/2014. The grey circles indicate affected 
countries, not influenza epicenters. (Map provided [30].) 
 
It has been shown that the spread of different lineages of AI viruses primarily 
depends on geographical influences, and less on host adaptions or temporal 
pressures [26]. In numerous countries where H9N2 infections in poultry have 




Examination studies showed that the prevalence of H9N2 in East and South East 
Asian countries reaches 7-8% in chickens in live bird markets in South Korea, 
followed by 16,5 % in retail markets in Bangladesh. Authors reported H9N2 
prevalences of 13 % in chicken, 22% in minor poultry and 3% in ducks. Almost all 
samples (94%) that were tested AI positive in Bangladesh were of the H9N2 
subtype [32]. 
2.2.2 Human Cases and Prevalence in People 
Repeated zoonotic infections with H9N2 have been reported from 1998-2009 (as 
of 11/2010 [33, 34]). In 1999, for instance, in Hong Kong, China, two little 
children of one and four years of age had atypical AI viruses in their 
nasopharyngeal aspirates. Thorough analyses confirmed the presence of H9N2 
[35]. The clinical signs including an inflamed oropharynx, vomiting, abdominal 
pain, fever below 40°C and poor appetite were self-limited and not life-threatening. 
The patients were treated in different hospitals and had lived geographically 
separated in Hong Kong, without having traveled to mainland China or abroad 
recently. In one of the patients, a contact with live chickens could not be excluded.  
The same year, Peiris et al. investigated the titers of neutralizing antibodies against 
H9N2 in blood donor samples in Hong Kong. The fact that 2% of the people were 
tested positive suggests that they had had contact with the virus [35].  
2.2.3 Evolution 
In Southern China, a possible AI epicenter, H9N2 viruses divide into two lineages 
which are manly perpetuated by chicken and quail. Y280-like viruses, represented 
by a strain named A/Duck/Hong Kong/Y280/97 are predominately found in 
chicken, whereas quails rather tend to be susceptible for viruses subsumed under 
the term G1-like viruses, whose prototype is A/Quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 [36]. 
Li et al. showed that ducks that were infected with AI H9N2 had gene sequences 
for HA and NA surface proteins deriving from the Y280-like virus lineage. Their 
NS and M genes, however, originated from G1-like viruses. This suggests in both 
cases that gene material is transferred from terrestrial poultry, namely chicken and 
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quail, into aquatic birds, showing a movement of viral genetic information in the 
opposite direction than assumed previously. Until this moment, only a gene flux 
from aquatic birds to terrestrial poultry, pigs and men had been observed.   
Beyond this, the ducks had H9N2 viruses with RNP genes that were closely related 
to a HPAI H5N1 strain that emerged in Hong Kong in 2001. Furthermore, they 
show parallels to HPAI H5N1 strains isolated in 1997 as the latter received 6 
segments from H9N2 making them “most similiar in 6 of the 8 gene segments” 
[32]. Given this similarity of HPAI H5N1 viruses and LPAI H9N2 viruses, it is 
suggested that infections with the latter subtype may confer protection for HPAI 
H5N1 viruses and might have permitted them to circulate in poultry [32].   
Li et al. provide evidence that ducks, situated on a point of bidirectional gene flow, 
may generate double or triple reassortants with amino acid signatures in their 
hemagglutinin that have a specificity for α2,6-Gal sialic acids residues, suggesting 
that the reassortants have the potential to infect people. As H9N2 viruses do not 
severely harm birds or people and spread without being noticed immediately but 
contribute to HPAI viruses, they are considered to be more, rather than less eligible 
to be at least partially responsible for a next pandemic and should be monitored 
continuously.  
The current surveillance of newly emerged LPAI H7N9 in 2013 reveals similar 
findings in genetic analogy to H9N2: six of its internal genes are of avian origin 
and derived from H9N2. However, this upcoming strain poses new challenges as it 
does not cause clinical signs in poultry but leads to severe illness and death: at least 
317 human cases have been reported with a mortality of 22% in humans (as of 
01/2014 [37]).  
Taken together, H9N2 viruses and their viral progeny threaten avian and human 
populations and highlight the urgent need of a better understanding of their 
diversity, the spread of emerging AI viruses and a reliable estimation of their 
pathogenic potential for the coming years. 
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2.2.4 Specific Clinical Signs 
In comparison to other LPAI infections, H9N2 viruses do not cause strain specific 
clinical signs which could lead to a suspicion or confirmation of an infection with 
this subtype.  
2.2.5 Pathogenesis in Different Species 
Given that H9N2 viruses infected numerous species around the globe and have 
caused human infections, they are monitored continuously by the World Health 
Organization. They are considered a health threat for people due to repeated 
zoonotic infections and are therefore subjected to intensive research. A study 
conducted by Baranovich et al (SJCEIRS) [38] assessed the virulence and 
transmission of 12 different H9N2 viruses (see Table 1) in experimental conditions 
on normal Human Bronchial Epithelial Cells (NHBE) and in ferrets, mice, pigs and 
ducks. The study also dealt with the effectiveness of commercially available 
antivirals (all tested H9N2 viruses were sensitive to NA inhibitors, some were 
resistant to Adamantanes).  
As expected, viruses from human origin grew to higher titers on human bronchial 
epithelial cells than viruses that originated from avian hosts. The swine/HK virus 
grew to the same titers as the human strains, but with a growth delay. In mice, most 
avian strains replicated at or below the limit of detection. Only the mice that had 
been inoculated with chicken/Beijing showed viral titers similar to those induced 
by mammalian strains. However, all virus strains caused seroconversion. In pigs, 
no clinical symptoms could be observed and none of the pigs seroconverted but a 
direct transmission could be seen in one case (with the human virus HK/33982), as 
well as moderate shedding titers in another single animal infected with HK/33982. 
The transmission experiments in ferrets revealed that only viruses from 
mammalian origin transmitted, and only by direct contact. Among the H9N2 
viruses tested, aerosol transmission did indeed not occur. Only a single virus led to 
detectable shedding in ducks (shorebird/DE), suggesting that LPAI H9N2 viruses 




Negovetich et al. collected more than 5700 samples in Bangladesh, and found that 
there were more oropharyngeal than cloacal swabs positive for influenza [32]. 
They drew the conclusion that direct transmission and aerosol carryover are the 
predominant modes of transmission. Direct contact transmission could be observed 
in chickens and ferrets and is considered to be the route that lead to human 
infections [32, 39]. In comparison, aerosol transmission happens in chickens but 
has not been seen in ferrets, indicating that human to human transmission is limited 
at the moment [32].  
 
 







2.3 MVA Vector Vaccine 
The « Modified Vaccinia Virus Ankara », abbreviated MVA, serves as a safe and 
versatile viral vector system for vaccine development. MVA can be equipped with 
heterologous gene sequences in order to produce foreign proteins [40-45]. 
MVA was derived from the conventional Vaccina Virus Ankara through serial 
passages on chicken embryo fibroblasts (CEF). During this procedure, the virus 
had lost about 27 kilo bases of genetic information as demonstrated by six major 
genomic deletions. Resulting MVA became highly attenuated and replication-
deficient in cells of mammalian origin. 
By using a transfer plasmid, an artificially produced genetic sequence can be 
placed under the transcriptional control of an MVA-specific promoter and inserted 
into the virus‟ genome by homologous recombination [46].  
The MVA vector has become replication-incompetent and avirulent due to the loss 
of many viral genes encoding for proteins interfering with host (cell) immune 
functions. Therefore, MVA was established as particularly safe viral vector without 
possibility to regain its pathogenic potential by further passaging [47].  
In large field trials, over 120.000 humans have been successfully vaccinated with 
MVA [48]. It therefore serves as non-replicating, safe, and efficient expression 
vector and can be handled under biosafety level 1 in Europe and the USA. 
To date only very few studies have used MVA vaccines in chicken or other birds. 
Yet, a first candidate recombinant MVA vaccine delivering AI H5 was proven to be 
immunogenic and protective in chicken vaccine experiments [40, 49].   
2.3.1 Ancestral HA strategy 
Due to the genetic but also antigenic diversity of many avian influenza viruses, it is 
challenging to find cross-reactive vaccines that would protect against several 
strains at a time within a given HxNy subtype. The most potent antibody response 
targets the most exposed but also the most variable viral protein: HA. At present, 
the World Health Organization seeks to keep pace with the continuous 
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diversification by producing new vaccine seed strains. Economic restrictions, but 
also the impossibility to stockpile a large number of different vaccination doses 
fuel the research on new approaches.   
One of the possible strategies to obtain cross-reactive influenza vaccines is to use 
“ancestral” antigens. Ancestral sequences are artificial computationally derived 
amino acid (aa) sequences that would be located at the node of phylogenetic trees, 
for example the ancestral HA sequence used for the challenge (HAanc). Ducatez et 
al. generated ancestral H5N1 vaccines (whole virus inactivated vaccines) that 
conferred cross-clade protection for morbidity and mortality in the ferret model 














3. Material and Methods 
Unless otherwise indicated, the laboratory procedures were carried out in strict 
accordance with the Manual on Animal Influenza Diagnosis and Surveillance of 
the World Health Organization [37].  
The objectives of the strain selections for the phylogeny was to include a 
representative subset of all G1-like strains and to keep the number of sequences 
reasonable to be able to read the phylogeny and run marginal reconstruction 
algorithms. 
3.1 Vaccine Production 
3.1.1 Provision of Vaccine Components 
The MVA vector platform was provided by the Institute for Infectious Diseases, LMU 
University of Munich, Germany. The ancestral sequence originates from the National 
Veterinary School in Toulouse, France. The cloning of the ancestral H9 (H9anc) 
sequence into the vector, the testing of its genetic purity and stability as well as the 
analysis for correct expression were done in Munich. The MVA-H9 vaccine was then 
ready to use and shipped to France. 
 
3.1.2 Dataset selection and Phylogenetic Analyses 
We downloaded the nucleotide sequences of HA genes of LPAI H9N2 viruses and 
aligned them with ClustalW [51]. We included in the phylogenetic tree reference 
H9N2 HA sequences as well as representative strains from the Middle East (Egypt, 
UAE, Israel, Iran), Tunisia and from the Indian subcontinent (G1-like strains). 
Estimates of statistical support for the observed phylogenies were calculated by 
performing 1,000 bootstrap replicates.  
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3.1.3 Generation of Ancestral Sequence 
Nucleotide alignments are the base for the calculation of amino acid sequences. 
We used the ANCESCON computer program with a marginal reconstruction 
method to calculate ancestral sequences. The method was used with default 
settings except that a maximum likelihood rate factor was chosen. The ancestral 
protein sequence that is finally determined is located at a node point of several 
strain branches. To generate the HA nucleotide sequence that expresses the 
putative ancestral proteins, the amino acid (aa) sequences were compared with aa 
sequences available in GenBank using BLAST and served to convert the ancestral 
sequence into a nucleotide (nt) sequence at positions where several nt triplets were 
theoretically possible. The aa homology between the H9anc sequence and the 
HAtun sequence is 94%. 
 
3.1.4 Generation of recombinant MVA vaccine 
Generation, clonal isolation and in vitro characterization of the recombinant MVA 
(rMVA) vaccine and the purification and quality control of vaccine preparations 
were using established methods and protocols [46]. Briefly, plasmid vectors were 
used to insert the recombinant H9 gene sequence into the DNA MVA genome. 
They were transfected into MVA-infected cells where homologous recombination 
between plasmid DNA and MVA occurred. Plasmid vectors contained MVA flanks, 
authentic start and stop codons, the ancestral H9 sequence and a VACV-specific 
promoter, which arranges the right orientation of the recombinant gene. In order to 
harvest the highest possible amount of rMVA and obtain it as clonally pure as 
possible, well-separated viral foci from the wells infected with the highest dilutions 





















































Figure 5: Schematic procedure to create an ancestral sequence by using National Center for 
Biotechnology Information Influenza Virus Resource Sequences and the ANCESCON Computer 
Programm. 
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3.1.5 Purification, Titration and Quality Control of the rMVA  
To remove cellular debris and recombinant proteins the virus solution was frozen, 
thawed, and ultra-centrifuged through a sucrose cushion. The titration of infectivity 
of MVA stock preparation was done on CEF. Using a specific immune-peroxidase 
staining of cells that contained viral antigen, viral foci could be detected. The 
correct location of the inserted gene was checked by PCR and protein expression 
verified by Western Blot. 
3.2 Birds and Challenge Virus Strain 
3.2.1 Birds 
44 one-day old specific pathogen free (SPF) White Leghorn chickens were 
purchased at the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – 
Plateforme d‟infectiologie expérimentale (PFIE), Nouzilly, France. As listed 
below, the breeder assures that the chickens are free from certain pathogens. For 
this study, it is necessary to work on animal flocks that have never been in contact 
with AIV before as antibodies that exist due to maternal immunity could interfere 
with the vaccine.   
 
Table 2: Pathogens SPF chickens are screened for before being used for scientific purposes. 
Microorganism Detection method Number and Frequency 
Salmonella pullorum 
 
Serum Agglutination Test  
 
 
100% at 20-21 weeks of age + 6% 
every 8 weeks 
Mycoplasma gallisepticum 
Mycoplasma synoviae 




Serum Agglutination Test 
EDS 76 HI 
 
Adenovirus Gel Immunodiffusion  
Infectious Bursal Disease 




NDV HI 32% (at 20-21 weeks )……………….. 
+ 6% (every 8 weeks) 
Influenza Gel Immunodiffusion 32% (at 20-21 weeks)……………….. 
+ 6% (every 8 weeks) 
Infectious Bronchitis Gel Immunodiffusion 100% (at 20-21 weeks)……………… 
+ 6% (every 8 weeks) 
Infectious Anemia ELISA 32% (at 20-21 weeks) 
Avian Leucosis ELISA (P27) 100% (cages at 24-26 weeks) + 
 2 eggs/ hen average 
ILT ELISA 32% (at 20-21 weeks) 
Marek Disease PCR 6% (at 8-10 and 20-22 weeks) +  
6% of  livestock (every 8 weeks)  
3.2.2 Challenge Strain A/chicken/Tunisia/12/2010  
A/chicken/Tunisia/12/2010 is an AI virus strain that expresses the hemagglutinin 9 
and the neuraminidase 2 and belongs therefore to the H9N2 subtype. In 2010, it 
was isolated from a chicken in Tunisia, brought under the applicable safety 
measures to France and is currently stored at -80°C in the laboratory of virology of 
the ENV Toulouse. In order to make sure that the virus did not undergo genetic 
changes during the preparation of the experiment, we sequenced the hemagglutinin 
segment right before the challenge of the birds and could confirm genetic identity.  
3.3 Immunization and Challenge 
3.3.1 Setup and Protocol Timeline of the Animal Experiment 
Figure 6 shows an overview of the course of the animal experiment. In total, it 
lasted 8 weeks and included the sampling of 183 blood tubes, 204 oropharyngeal 
swabs and the performance of 12 necropsies.   
The birds were kept in within the animal facilities (biosafety level 2) of the ENV 
Toulouse and fed ad libitum with a commercially available mixture of poultry food 




3.3.2 Vaccine Dose and Route of Inoculation 
The birds from group A were vaccinated and boosted at day -21 and day 0 
respectively with a dose of 108 PFU (100 µl) each by intramuscular route. The 
same route and dose was used for the birds from group B, which were vaccinated 
once at day 0.  Each bird was infected with 109 EID50 A/chicken/Tunisia/2010 in 
500µl total by ocular, nasal and intratracheal route. 
 
3.3.3 Observation of Clinical Signs 
Throughout the experiment the birds were monitored at least once a day to 
evaluate the clinical signs they may display. We paid attention to any kind of 
pathology but especially to disorders of the respiratory system. Clinical signs we 
expected ranged from none at all to rattles, light gasping and coughing as well as 
seromucoid airway exudates.   
 
3.3.4 Swab Sampling 
 We used soft cotton swabs to get saliva and epithelial cells of the mucous 
membrane of the oral cavity. In order to avoid bleedings and suffering of the 
animals only oropharygeal swabs were preferred to tracheal swabs. Immediately 
after rubbing during approximately 5-8 sec, they were stored temporarily in 1 ml of 
refrigerated PBS supplemented with antibiotics (penicillin, streptomycin) and a 
140 µl aliquot was collected for further RNA extraction before both tubes were 
frozen at -80°C. Thus, the following RNA extraction was performed on single 
thawed virus samples.  
 
3.3.5 Necropsy 
On day 25, i.e. four days post infection, we euthanized three birds per group to 
perform an autopsy. After a closer look on the general health status (plumage, 
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nutritional status, orifices...) we examined the inner surface of the abdominal 
cavity, the air sacs, the peritoneum of the organs and other tissues that are prone to 
suffer damage from an AI infection. For histological analyses, we preserved 
samples of the trachea, lungs with rip cage to avoid pulmonary collapse, small 








     
        
 
 
     PS       J-18   J-15          J-12                        J-1                              J3       J4        J5        J6                                              OS J22...        à           J28 
    
 
J-21                                                                                  J0                                                  J21                                                                    J35 
Group A : double vaccination, challenged 
Group B : simple vaccination, challenged 
Group C : not vaccinated, not challenged 
Group D : not vaccinated, challenged 




     
 
Figure 6: Timeline of the animal experiment. Total duration: 8 weeks. Blood sampling (PS) at day (J) -22, -18, -15 etc. (red=group A, blue=group B). 


































































Necropsies at J24 of 3 chicken per group 
TS from J22 to J28 for groups A, B, D 
PS from J20 to J35 for all animals 
Key:   J= day,  PS= blood sample,  OS= oropharyngeal  swab,  N= Necropsie 




3.3.6 Histopathology and Immunohistochemistry  
All animals were subjected to a complete post-mortem examination. Tissue 
samples of trachea (one transversal section in the proximal portion and another one 
in the terminal portion), lungs and caecum were taken and stored in 10 % neutral 
formalin. After fixation, tissues were routinely processed in paraffin blocks, 
sectioned at 4 μm and stained with hematoxylin and eosin (H&E) for microscopic 
examination. Lesions were assessed histologically and their intensity was graded 
as: no lesion, minimal, slight, moderate, marked or severe. 
Immunostainings were performed on paraffin-embedded sections of trachea with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus antibody (Argene, 11-030, 
pronase 0,05 % retrieval solution, 10 minutes at 37°C: antibody dilution 1/50, 
incubation overnight, at 4°C). The immunohistochemical staining was revealed 
with a biotinylated polyclonal goat anti-mouse Immunoglobulins conjugated with 
horseradish peroxidise (HRP) (Dako, LSAB2 system-HRP, K0675) and the 
diaminobenzidine chromagen of the HRP (Thermo Scientific, TA-125-HDX).  
3.4 Virus Shedding Titration 
3.4.1 RNA extractions 
The Qiagen QIAamp® Viral RNA Kit (third edition) was used for the RNA 




Figure 7: Process of viral RNA extraction with the Qiagen QIAamp® Viral RNA Kit (third 
edition) was done as shown on the right side. 
3.4.2 Reverse Transcription Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction (rt-RT-PCR)  
We used the following one-step rt-RT-PCR amplification protocol and program to 
detect H9 AI viruses in the oropharyngeal swabs. The primers targeted conserved 




A known amount of plasmid (StrataClone Blunt PCR Cloning Vector pSC-B-
amp/kan, Agilent Technologies) that contained the same matrix gene sequence was 
serially diluted. The resulting standard curves were compared to the curves 
obtained from the swab samples and allowed a calculation of the numbers of RNA 
copies with the following formula:  
 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑁𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑠 =




650 ∗ (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑕 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑑 + 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑕 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 (𝑏𝑝))
 
 
Component Amount (for one reaction) 
Sybr G Quantitect Qiagen Mastermix (2x) 5 µl 
RT-mix 0,1 µl 
Forward primer: M52C (10 µM) 0,5 µl 
Reverse primer: M253R (10µM) 0,5 µl 
RNA free water 1,9 µL 
RNA 2 µl 
Total volume 10 µl 














 of Cycles 
Duration (sec) 
RT 50 none 1 1800 
Activation 95 none 1 15 
PCR 95 none 40 15 
60 single 40 
Melting 
Curve 
95 none 1 5 
65 none 60 
97 continuous - 
Total duration of the program: 1 hour 54 minutes 
3.5 Serology 
3.5.1 Hemagglutination Inhibition (HI) Assay 
In each HI Assay, the components added up to a final volume of 100 µl with a 
constant amount of virus solution (25 µl) and chicken red blood cells (RBC, 50 µl). 
The sera were serially diluted with PBS starting with a 1:10 receptor destroying 
enzyme (RDE) mix (25 µl) to remove unspecific inhibitors and gain better results. 
In case the antibodies match the antigen and the titer is high enough to link all 
viruses, the subsequently added RBC will sink to the bottom of the V-shaped well: 
the hemagglutination has been inhibited by the antibodies.  
 
3.5.2 Seroneutralization 
The seroneutralization assay is an assay to analyse virus-specific antibodies by 
visualizing the effect that a specific antibody-antigen mixture has on a cell 
monolayer.   
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AI H9N2 viruses A/chicken/Tunisia/2010 were mixed with serial dilutions of sera 
preparations and added after incubation to Madin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) 
cells. During the following days, a cytopathic effect may be observed if 1) the 
serum antibodies do not match the antigen and do not inactivate the virus or 2)  the 
serum antibody titer is too low to bind all viruses. This test allows for detection and 
titration of neutralizing antibodies.  
In comparison to an in vivo study, the loss of cells can easily be observed, whereas 
in an animal model a cytopathic effect can be there but invisible because it does not 
















4.1 Vaccine design 
Figure 8 shows a phylogenetic tree of LPAI H9 sequences. It includes 117 strains 
from 11 different countries that were isolated between 2011 and 2013. The 
majority belongs to G1-like H9N2 viruses, others are from the Y280-like group 
and few are wild bird strains (neither G1-like nor Y280-like viruses). The 
highlighted node #126 is the “G1-H9 ancestor”, it subsumes 104 sequences and is a 
computationally derived, ancestral sequence that was chosen for insertion into the 













Figure 8: Phylogenetic tree of H9N2 viruses. The highlighted node (#126) corresponds to the 
ancestral sequence that formed part of the vaccine.  
HA phylogenetic tree of 
recent (2011-now) G1 H9N2 
influenza viruses from the 
Middle East, the Indian 
subcontinent and the 
environment with reference 
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       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  TTGCGAGTAAGATCCAATGGGAATCTAATTGCTCCATGGTaTGGACACGTTCTCTCAGGAGAGAGCCATGGGAGAATTTTGAAAACTGATTTAAACAGTGGTAATTGTGTAGTGCAATGTCAGACTGAAAAAGGTGGCCTAAACAGTACA  
        L  R  V  R  S  N  G  N  L  I  A  P  W  Y  G  H  V  L  S  G  E  S  H  G  R  I  L  K  T  D  L  N  S  G  N  C  V  V  Q  C  Q  T  E  K  G  G  L  N  S  T  
 
               910       920       930       940       950       960       970       980       990       1000      1010      1020      1030      1040      1050              
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  TTACCTTTCCACAATATCAGTAAATATGCATTTGGGaccTGCCCCAAATATATTGGAGTCAAGAGTCTCAAACTGGCAATCGGTCTGAGAAATGTGCCTGCCAGGTCAAGTAGAGGGCTATTTGGAGCCATAGCTGGATTCATAGAAGGA  
        L  P  F  H  N  I  S  K  Y  A  F  G  T  C  P  K  Y  I  G  V  K  S  L  K  L  A  I  G  L  R  N  V  P  A  R  S  S  R  G  L  F  G  A  I  A  G  F  I  E  G  
 
               1060      1070      1080      1090      1100      1110      1120      1130      1140      1150      1160      1170      1180      1190      1200              
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  GGTTGGCCAGGGCTGGTTGCCGGTTGGTATGGTTTCCAACATTCAAATGATCAAGGGGTTGGCATGGCTGCAGATAGGGATTCCACTCAAAAGGCAGTTGACAAAATAACATCCAAGGTGAACAATATAGTCGACAAGATGAACAAGCAA  
        G  W  P  G  L  V  A  G  W  Y  G  F  Q  H  S  N  D  Q  G  V  G  M  A  A  D  R  D  S  T  Q  K  A  V  D  K  I  T  S  K  V  N  N  I  V  D  K  M  N  K  Q  
 
               1210      1220      1230      1240      1250      1260      1270      1280      1290      1300      1310      1320      1330      1340      1350              
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  TATGAAATAATTGATCATGAATTCAGTGAGGTTGAAACTAGACTCAATATGATCAATAACAAGATTGATGACCAAATACAAgAcGTATGGGCATATAATGCAGAGTTGCTAGTGCTACTTGAGAACCAGAAAACACTCGATGAGCATGAC  
        Y  E  I  I  D  H  E  F  S  E  V  E  T  R  L  N  M  I  N  N  K  I  D  D  Q  I  Q  D  V  W  A  Y  N  A  E  L  L  V  L  L  E  N  Q  K  T  L  D  E  H  D  
 
               1360      1370      1380      1390      1400      1410      1420      1430      1440      1450      1460      1470      1480      1490      1500              
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  GCAAACGTGAACAACCTATACAACAAAGTGAAAAGGGCCTTAGGCTCCAATGCGATGGAAGATGGGAAAGGCTGCTTCGAGTTATACCACAAATGTGATGATCAATGCATGGAAACTATTCGAAACGGGACCTATAATAGGAGAAAGTAC  
        A  N  V  N  N  L  Y  N  K  V  K  R  A  L  G  S  N  A  M  E  D  G  K  G  C  F  E  L  Y  H  K  C  D  D  Q  C  M  E  T  I  R  N  G  T  Y  N  R  R  K  Y  
 
               1510      1520      1530      1540      1550      1560      1570      1580      1590      1600      1610      1620      1630      1640      1650              
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....| 
AncH9  AAAGAGGAATCAAGACTAGaAAGGCAGAAAATAGAGGGAGTTAAACTGGAATCTGAGGGGACTTACAAAATACTTACCATTTATTCGACTGTCGCCTCATCTCTTGTGCTTGCAATGGGGTTTGCTGCCTTCTTATTCTGGGCCATGTCA  
        K  E  E  S  R  L  E  R  Q  K  I  E  G  V  K  L  E  S  E  G  T  Y  K  I  L  T  I  Y  S  T  V  A  S  S  L  V  L  A  M  G  F  A  A  F  L  F  W  A  M  S  
 
               1660      1670      1680      1690      1700          
       ....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|....|.... 
AncH9  AATGGATCATGCAGATGCAACATCTGTATATAATTAGCAAAAACACCCTTGTTTCTACT  
        N  G  S  C  R  C  N  I  C  I  *  L  A  K  T  P  L  F  L   




4.2 Clinical Appearance 
4.2.1 Clinical Signs 
Throughout the eight weeks of the animal experiment, not a single chicken of 
group A (double vaccinated), group B (single vaccinated) and group C (control 
group) displayed any clinical signs. However, in group D chickens number 3 and 
10 showed light gasping on day 3. Bird number 5 showed comparable signs on 
days 4 and 5. 
4.2.2 Macroscopic Lesions  
During the necropsy, none of the chicken showed macroscopic lesions, 
regardless of the group.  
4.2.3 Histopathology 
The main histopathological lesions were observed in the trachea and the bronchi. 
These lesions consisted of diffuse to multifocal mild tracheitis and multifocal to 
focal mild bronchitis (all lesions are summarized in figures 11-12). 
The main elementary lesions of subacute tracheitis were: 
 
- Loss of ciliature, 
- Focal necrosis and exfoliation of the superficial mucosal epithelium, 
- Regenerative epithelial hyperplasia, 
- Squamous epithelial metaplasia, 
- Inflammatory cellular infiltrates in the lamina propria with mononuclear   
    cells (lymphocytes, plasmocytes and macrophages) and a few heterophils. 
 
In the lesions of subacute bronchitis, regenerative epithelial hyperplasia and 
inflammatory cellular infiltrates in the lamina propria with mononuclear cells 





Double vaccinated group A birds show only a partial loss of ciliature, whereas 
group C control birds were entirely healthy. The strongest lesions were seen in the 
unvaccinated group D with all animals displaying tracheitis and bronchitis 
(multifocal moderate to diffuse marked inflammations). Intermediate respiratory 






Figure 10: Healthy control bird C8. Trachea, hematoxylin & 
eosin X 50): tracheal epithelium with ciliature. 
 
 
Figure 11: Healthy control bird C8. Bronchus, hematoxylin 
& eosin, X50): bronchial epithelium with ciliature. 
 
Figure 12: A10, trachea, hematoxylin & eosin X 50): focal 
slight subacute tracheitis with loss of ciliature of some 
epithelial cells and small inflammatory cellular infiltrates in 
the lamina propria with mononuclear cells (lymphocytes, 
plasmocytes and macrophages) and a few heterophils. 
 
Figure 13: A10, bronchus, hematoxylin & eosin, X50): focal 
moderate subacute bronchitis with regenerative epithelial 
hyperplasia and inflammatory cellular infiltrates in the 
lamina propria (mononuclear cells (lymphocytes, 








Figure 14: D11, trachea, immunoperoxydase with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus 
antibody, x50): labelling of the nucleus of epithelial cells 
(chromogen: aminoethylcarbazole). 
 
Figure 15: D11, trachea, immunoperoxydase with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus 




Figure 16: D11, bronchus, immunoperoxydase with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus 
antibody, x50): labelling of the nucleus of epithelial cells 
(chromogen: diaminobenzidine). 
 
Figure 17: D11, bronchus, immunoperoxydase with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus 








Figure 18: D9, trachea, hematoxylin & eosin X 50): diffuse 
marked subacute tracheitis with loss of ciliature of many 
epithelial cells and large inflammatory cellular infiltrates in 
the lamina propria with mononuclear cells (lymphocytes, 
plasmocytes and macrophages) and a few heterophils. 
 
 
Figure 19: B11, caecum, immunoperoxydase with a 
monoclonal mouse anti-nucleoprotein Influenza A virus 
antibody, x50): labelling of the nucleus of some epithelial 
cells (chromogen: diaminobenzidine). 
 
 
Figure 20: (B11, caecum, hematoxylin & eosin, X50): no 
histopathological lesion. 
 
Figure 21: (A10, bronchus, hematoxylin & eosin, X50): 
focal moderate subacute bronchitis with regenerative 
epithelial hyperplasia and inflammatory cellular 
infiltrates in the lamina propria (mononuclear cells 






4.3 Virus Shedding 
4.3.1 Group Mean Virus Titres 
 Figure 22 and 23 show the group average virus titers form day 1 to 7 post infection 
(pi). In both diagrams the same data was used. Three chickens per group were 
euthanized on day 4 pi.  
The viral shedding peaked on day 4 pi with 9.35x103-11.46x103 RNA copies. The 
curves then dropped similarly to values of ~30-100 copies on day 6 pi, whereas on 
day 7 the vaccinated groups had virus titers at or below the limit of detection. 
Group D birds (not vaccinated, challenged) showed slightly higher titers.   
Figure 23 accentuates the longer clearance of the D group. The last two columns 
are significantly higher than in group A or B. In addition to that, 
 
Figure 22: Group average virus titers for all challenged birds from day 1 to 7 post infection. Each 
line represents one group: A (double vaccinated in black), B (single vaccinated in blue), D (not 













































Figure 23:  Group average virus titers for all challenged groups from day 1 to 7 post infection.  
the curves are overlapping but the columns are not, presenting the results separated 
from each other. 
4.3.2  Individual virus titers  
Figures 24, 25 and 26 show individual virus titers of all chickens of a group from 
day 1 to 7 post infection.  Each line represents a single animal. Three birds per 
group were euthanized on day 4 pi.    
Regardless the group, the virus titers vary strongly from one individual to another. 
In general, the birds excrete significant higher amounts of virus from day 1 to 4 pi 
than the following days. The diversity of excretion curves makes it difficult to find 
a description that is valuable for all of them. Their mean virus titers are 









































Figure 24: Individual virus titers of group A (double vaccinated) from day 1 to 7 post infection. 
Each line represents a single chicken. 
 
Figure 25: Individual virus titers of group B (single vaccinated) from day 1 to 7 post infection. 


















































































Figure 26: Individual virus titers of group D (not vaccinated, challenged) from day 1 to 7 post 
infection. Each line represents a single chicken. One animal shows a significantly higher titer on 
day 7. 
4.4 Serology 
In order to exclude an environmental contamination with H9 viruses, a HI was 
performed on the control chickens at three weeks of age. None of the chickens had 
antibodies anti-H9 would lead to a positive hemagglutination inhibition assay (HI).  
All chicken were SPF chickens and free of any flu antibodies or other cross 










































Days post challenge 
56 
 
Table 3: HI titers anti-A/chicken/Tunisia/12/2010 (Group C at three weeks of age)  
Chicken   
…          # 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 
Anti-H9  <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10 <10  <10 
 
Three weeks after the first vaccination of Group A, thus pre-boost, HI titers 
revealed detectable antibodies titers ranging from 10 to 160, with an average value 
of 35 (Table 3). 
Table 4: HI titers of Group A before boost (upper line: chicken number, lower line: antibody 
titers) 
bird      
# 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 
titers 60 20 20 15 20 15 160 40 10 15 20  30 
 
Figures 28 and 29 show the results from seroneutralization assays using sera  of 
birds from all groups. Whereas the controls chickens and the group D chickens do 
not show neutralizing antibodies, we found them in the vaccinated animal with 
titers ranging from 160 to ≥1280 for group A and 80 to 640 for group B. We tested 








Table 5: HI (antiH9) titers of five consecutive days after vaccination (Group B), *doubtful HI 
titer 
  bird # 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  
d3  10      10       
d4  20  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  10  20  10  
d5  20  20  20  40  20  40  20  20  20  10  10  
d6  40  40  10  40  30  40  40  20  20  20  20  
d7  80  80  20  10*  40  80  40  20  30  40  40  
 
Figure 27: HI (antiH9) titers of Group B during five consecutive days after vaccination. The 
same data as presented in Table 4 was used. 
10
100
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Figure 28: Group A seroneutralization assay results one day before challenge. 
 
 





























































 Comparison of Group A and B anti-H9 titers three weeks after vaccination. Note that Group A chickens were vaccinated at one day of age, 
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Figure 30: HI  antibody titers of Group A and B before challenge. The highest anti-H9 titers are found in Group A, however, several chickens  of 


























                               
Figure 31: HI antibody titers of Group A, B and D two weeks after challenge. While Group A and D show comparable results, Group B chickens 






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
black: A, double vaccinated               blue: B, single vaccinated                   grey: D, not vaccinated   

















































Figure 32: Kinetics of anti H9 antibodies for group A. Evolution of HI antibody titers of Group A after two 3-week intervals and one 2-week interval. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Figure 33: Kinetics of HI antibody titers of Group B. Unlike Group A birds, these were vaccinated at three weeks of age and challenged at  


















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Group A Group B 
3 weeks old birds (vaccination at 1 day of age) 6 weeks old birds (vaccination at 3 weeks of age) 
Figure 34: Age-dependent anti-H9 HI antibody response after 1 vaccination with the MVA-H9 vaccine. Comparison of Group A and B anti-
H9 titers three weeks after vaccination. Note that Group A chickens were vaccinated at one day of age, while Group B chickens were three 
































Figures 30 to 34 present HI titers results. The antibodies (anti-challenge strain 
A/chicken/Tunisia/12/2010) were extracted from blood samples taken before the 
boost, before the challenge and two weeks post challenge.  
Pre-challenge antibody titers were higher in double vaccinated group A chickens, 
although single vaccinated group B bird titers‟ resulted higher than group A titers 
before their boost. It has to be taken into consideration that group B animals were 
vaccinated at three weeks of age, and not at day 1 like group A.    
Post-challenge titers, however, generally reached higher levels in single vaccinated 
group B birds, measured two weeks after the infection.  Chickens that had not 
been vaccinated (group D) showed two-fold to five-fold lower titers compared two 
double-vaccinated group B, or the same to three-fold lower titers than group A. 
4.5 Cross-reactivity of ancestral MVA H9 sera with different H9N2 viruses 
We tested the pooled sera of the double vaccinated group A one day before 
challenge for cross-reactivity against the following H9N2 strains from Europe, 
Asia and the Middle East.  




A/HONG KONG/33982/2009 (G1) 
A/ENVIRONMENT/BANGLADESH/907/2009 (G1) 
A/CHICKEN/HONG KONG/TP38/2003 (Y280) 
A/CHICKEN/HONG KONG/G9/97 (Y280) 
A/CHICKEN/BEIJING/1/94 (Y280) 
A/SHOREBIRD/DE/249/2006 (wild bird H9N2) 
  
Although the pooled sera antibody titer amounted to 320 in a HI assay with the 




5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The object of this study was to evaluate the efficiency of the recombinant MVA-H9 
vaccine in the chicken model. We vaccinated naive birds and used an H9N2 field 
strain for challenge in order to measure the protection it confers in two different 
vaccination regimens.   
 
According to the results of previous publications, we also observed a fast and 
substantial onset of antibody production in vaccinated chickens [40, 53]. However, 
while the immunoglobulins were highly reactive in HI assays and 
seroneutralization tests, we found no evidence for substantial protective efficacy in 
vivo. Given the fact that little is known about experimental vaccination with MVA 
in chickens [49], we presume that there is a low degree of correlation between the 
reduction of virus shedding, clinical protection of the birds and HI titers of 
circulating antibodies as suggested by Terregino et al. [54]. In a comparative study 
of several commercially available inactivated whole virus H5 vaccines and two 
recombinant vector platforms (NDV-H5/MVA-H5) in a HPAI H5 challenge, one of 
the former vaccines that induced reasonable HI titers (6.1log2) could not protect 
20% of the chicken which succumbed to the infection. In contrast, MVA-H5 
induced lesser HI titers but protected all birds from fatal disease [49]. 
Therefore, the outcome of challenge studies in chickens is somewhat difficult to 
predict by serological tests evaluating circulating antibodies before the challenge 
infection.  
In contrast, in other animal models, the levels of antibody responses measured by 
HI or seroneutralization appear to correlate well with protection obtained upon 
challenge, as recently shown with MVA-H7 immunization and LPAI H7N9 
challenge in the ferret model [53].  
 
The amino acid homology between the vaccine antigen and the field virus has been 
shown to influence strongly the capacity to confer in vivo protection, notably in 
HA expressing recombinant vaccines, such as infectious laryngotracheitis and 
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fowlpox virus vectors [55, 56]. A Newcastle Disease Virus platform expressing a 
H5 (NDV-H5) with less than ~94% aa homology could not stimulate immune 
responses comparable to those obtained with a NDV vector vaccine delivering an 
HA antigen nearly identical to the one of the challenge virus used for infection 
[49].  
In the present study, an amino acid homology of 94% between the HA of the 
Tunisian strain and the ancestral HA sequence could be one reason for insufficient 
protection in vivo. Ancestral whole-influenza virus vaccines have, however, 
provided robust protection in vitro and in vivo and against several HPAI H5N1 
strains in the ferret model [50].  
Due to the fact that ancestral sequences are computationally derived nucleotide 
alignments, there is no naturally occurring live virus expressing the ancestral H9 
(H9anc). If this AI H9ancN2 virus had existed, it could have been used for the 
challenge, representing a 100% HA homology with the challenge strain.     
Besides, there are more factors that influence the generation of the immune 
response, for example the addition of adjuvants like aluminum hydroxide, paraffin 
oil or amine polymers [57].   
 
By using rt-RT PCR, we detected viral RNA until day 6 post-challenge, with a 
precipitous decline after the fourth day. Unexpectedly, 100% of all vaccinated and 
infected chicken were shedding virus at least during four days whereas in a former 
study values of only 50% are mentioned [49]. Evidently, the birds were not able to 
avoid viral replication efficiently, irrespective of their age and the vaccine regimen. 
To evaluate whether the virus that was obtained by oropharyngeal swabbing once a 
day during 7 days post-challenge is dead or still replication-competent, in-ovo 
amplification on embryonated chicken eggs can be done and, subsequently, the 
Egg Infectious Dosage (EID50) is calculated. As we did not perform such 
experiments, we do not know, if the birds shed live LPAI H9N2 viruses. 
Veits et al. found positive swab samples on day four during their MVA-H5 study in 
chicken [49].  
 
Interestingly, the histopathological results indicated that the vaccination reduced 
67 
 
microscopic lesions, suggesting a positive effect of the MVA-H9 vaccine on 
disease outcome.  
Virus replication and microscopic lesions after intranasal inoculation are normally 
confined to epithelial cells of the upper respiratory tract. Additionally, we 
inoculated the birds intratracheally, causing moderate subacute bronchitis with 
regenerative epithelial hyperplasia and inflammatory cellular infiltrates in the 
lamina propria. Alterations of tissues of the digestive tract occurred. No 
histological slide preparations of nervous tissues were done as we did not observe 
CNS signs during the animal experiment. Ascending infections from the olfactory 
nerves leading to neurologic manifestations in the brain subsequent to intraocular 
and intranasal infection are not to be expected in LPAI studies. If the bird is 
infected through an intravenous route it is primarily the kidneys that exhibit tubular 
damage, likely because of virus strains with renal tropism.   
 
Audible and visual signs of illness were hardly observed and reveal an ambivalent 
fact: LPAI viruses like the Tunisian strain we inoculated the chicken with do not 
lead to clinical signs and, as they do so, there are no signs that can be reduced or 
prevented by any vaccine. Such strains are considered to be less dangerous for 
humans and animals and can be handled under less strict biosafety measures 
(biosafety level 2). This means that studies using LPAI AI viruses are conducted in 
favor of animal welfare politics and permissions from ethical committees are 
granted more easily. Moreover, in comparison to studies using HPAI viruses, they 
are less expensive.  
By using a different species, such as mice, it could be possible to evaluate the 
vaccine‟s effect on the reduction of clinical signs, since mice are more susceptible 
to LPAI infections. Among others, they may display a loss of weight, respiratory 
symptoms, and a lower daily food intake. 
 
On the other hand, we cannot evaluate whether this MVA-H9 vector vaccine is 
able to reduce any sign of sickness, which is not due to the vector but to the low 
pathogenicity of the influenza virus. This important information about the direct 
effect of MVA-H9 vaccines on disease outcome could not be obtained. 
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It has to be mentioned that the reduction of clinical signs by a vaccine is a 
theoretical, scientific but not economically exploitable capacity. A spread of AI 
viruses in poultry populations due to covered signs of illness would fuel the 
distribution of the pathogens. For biosafety reasons, an ideal vaccine therefore 
should lower the clinical signs and, as an inevitable addition, be able to stop viral 
replication and the shedding of live virus.    
The antibodies we obtained during the study did not show any cross-reactivity with 
other H9N2 viruses. Concerning non-reactive G1 strains one could hypothesize 
that single amino acid mutations on the HA sequence prevent the immunoglobulins 
from binding the antigens.   
For the Y280 and shorebird strains this could be due to genetic and antigenic 
variation, given that the inserted H9 sequence was only an ancestor of G1 viruses. 
Seo et al. and Khalenkov et al. showed that concerning cross clade protection the 
cellular immunity plays an important role [58, 59]: seroneutralization tests and HI 
assays using antibodies of chicken that were infected with H9N2 viruses on 
H5N1viruses came out negative. H9N2 immunoglobulins are, at least in vitro, not 
mediating a cross-clade protection. In 1997, during a period of co-circulation of 
both AI virus clades in retail markets in Hong Kong, lethal HPAI H5N1 viruses 
caused hardly any signs of disease, although 18 confirmed human infections were 
noted the same year. These pathogens normally cause mortality rates of up to 
100% within 48 hours in chicken.   
Naive chicken that had never been in contact with either H9N2 or H5N1AI viruses 
were then transferred T lymphocytes or CD8+ T cells from H9N2 infected chicken. 
Seo et al. showed that by doing so, the birds survived a subsequent H5N1 
infection. Virus shedding in the feces continued.   
According to these findings, T cells are crucial for cross-clade protection, whereas 
antibodies are not able to neutralize the virus in vitro neither in Seo‟s study nor in 
ours.  
 
The results of the control group came out as we expected. All animals of this group 
were free of antibodies against the Tunisian challenge strain we had used for 
infection. This means that the control birds fulfilled their role as no contamination 
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occurred by the staff, the material or the handling. The existence of maternal 
immunity can be excluded as all birds originated from specific pathogen free 
flocks.   
 
In our setting, the vaccination was done by intramuscular route in contrast to the 
challenge virus, which was inoculated intraocularly, intranasally and 
intratracheally. The lack of mucosal immunoglobulin A antibodies could be 
responsible for a non-adequate immune response of the birds. A nasal application 
of MVA-H9 might induce a better level of protection and has to be evaluated in 
further studies.     
We found histological damages mostly in the upper and lower respiratory tract. 
Chen et al. attained a sterile immunity against homologous and heterologous 
pathogens in ferrets using a nasally applied live-attenuated H7N9 vaccine in the 
ferret model [60]. The challenge was done by using the same route of inoculation. 
This supports the theory of virus neutralization of airborne transmitted AI viruses 
by mucosal antibodies at the orifice of the body. 
 
Vectored MVA influenza vaccines have provided evidence to be safe and 
immunogenic in numerous preclinical studies in chicken, mice, macaques and 
ferrets [42, 44, 45, 49, 53, 61, 62]. In comparison to whole AI vaccines which have 
to be administered in inactivated form due to safety reasons, recombinant carrier 
delivering vaccine antigens are advantageous as they require only a little amount of 
antigen, making the production of such live vaccines cost-effective [49]. Moreover, 
they can be produced on large scale in a short period of time in order to provide 
sufficient doses for each individual [53].   
As AI viruses, notably HPAI H5N1 viruses, which have caused hundreds of deaths 
among humans, have become endemic in several countries like Egypt and China 
[63], it is crucial to be able to differentiate vaccinated from infected animals 
(DIVA). Although AI vaccines are banned from public use in many countries, 
undetectable spread under the vaccination coverage has to be avoided for any AI 
virus.  
Inactivated whole virus vaccines with the same HA but a different NA than the 
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circulating strain work according to the DIVA strategy. However, it is expensive 
and labour intensive to differentiate NA antibodies, making whole virus vaccines 
not suitable for mass screening tests. In addition to that, several subtypes can 
circulate in the field at the same time and lead to false-negative results.  
 
Common ELISA tests allow the simple detection of serum anti-NP or anti-MP 
immunoglobulins. Given the fact that vectored vaccines do not induce the 
generation of antibodies against conserved AI virus proteins as they typically 
express only the most prominent surface protein HA, they fulfill the requirements 
of the DIVA strategy and thousands of samples could be screened within 
reasonable expenditures.  
To investigate further advantages and inconveniences of ancestral MVA-H9 
vaccines in the chicken model, we propose a similar experimental setting, in which 
challenge virus and vaccine is applied intranasally. This could lead to a protection 
through mucosal antibodies. Besides, poultry farming needs vaccine strategies like 
nebulizing sprays that work without individual handling of each bird.   
Ancestral HA sequences with a higher degree of amino acid homology than the 
one used in our study may lead to cross-reactive antibodies. Therefore, it would be 
of interest to create phylogenetic trees of AI virus strains which are more closely 
related than G1 and Y280 strains, providing new ancestral sequences. 
In order to obtain comparable results regarding signs of illness, another species 
such as mice should serve as animal model in a future study.  
 
Safe and efficient vaccines are indispensable for the decrease of the virus load in 
the animal organism, thus lowering the infection pressure towards their fellow 









This work evaluates the efficiency of a recombinant vector vaccine (Modified 
Vaccinia Ankara, MVA) which has been equipped with a computationally derived, 
artificial genetic H9 influenza virus sequence named “ancestral sequence” in the 
chicken model. The aim of the study was to show that this vaccine induces 
protection from an experimental infection with low pathogenic Avian Influenza 
(AI) H9N2 viruses. As the high genetic and antigenic diversity of H9N2 viruses 
increases vaccine design complexity, one strategy to widen the range of vaccine 
coverage is to use an ancestor sequence.  
This work was done in cooperation between the National Veterinary School of 
Toulouse, France and the Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich, Germany. 
The genetically altered MVA vector vaccine was engineered in Munich. The 
inserted sequence was provided by the French laboratory where the animal 
facilities are located and the study was conducted. 
Due to their large poxvirus genomes and extensive manufacturing processes during 
the past decades, MVA vectors that are capable of carrying an inserted sequence 
and express the according protein on their surface without being replication 
competent in human and most mammalian cells. The immune system of the 
vaccinated organism produces antibodies that target this protein and are supposed 
to confer protection in our chickens. The inserted genetic material is an artificial 
hemagglutinin sequence that combines characteristics of multiple AI H9N2 
viruses. Hemagglutinins are the most important surface protein of influenza viruses 
as they are the main target of the immune response, among others. 
This clinical trial revealed that after an experimental infection, vaccinated animals 
show less histological damage, less influenza-positive cells and can eliminate the 
virus faster than unvaccinated individuals. All infected birds were shedding virus 
and a large majority stayed clinically healthy during the whole study. Although in 
vitro seroneutralization assays showed that the induced antibodies are neutralizing 
and protective on MDCK cell layers, they do not confer protection from virus 
replication in the chickens.  




Ce travail évalue l‟efficacité d‟un vaccin ancestral recombinant MVA (Modified 
Vaccinia Ankara) muni d‟une séquence artificielle chez le poulet. Cette séquence 
porte le nom d‟« ancestrale » car elle a été générée in silico afin de regrouper 
certaines caractéristiques des virus influenza aviaires H9N2. La diversité génétique 
et antigénique importante complexifie la production d‟un vaccin efficace. Une 
stratégie pour élargir son spectre d‟action est l‟usage d‟une séquence ancestrale.  
Ce travail a été réalisé en coopération entre l‟Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de 
Toulouse, France et la Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität de Munich, Allemagne. Le 
virus recombinant provenait des laboratoires de Munich alors que la séquence à 
insérer a été conçue en France. L‟infection expérimentale a été menée à Toulouse 
car les locaux étaient adaptés. 
Grâce à sa taille et aux procédures des modifications moléculaires des dernières 
décennies, le MVA est capable de porter cette séquence artificielle et d‟exprimer la 
protéine correspondante à sa surface. C´est elle qui induit la production d‟anticorps 
protecteurs chez les poulets. La séquence insérée code pour une hémagglutinine 
qui est caractéristique de nombreux virus H9N2. Cette hémagglutinine est 
importante chez les virus influenza aviaires car c‟est elle qui est ciblée par la 
réponse immunitaire de l‟hôte.  
Cette épreuve vaccinale a révélé que suite à une infection expérimentale les 
animaux vaccinés présentent moins de lésions microscopiques, moins de cellules 
influenza-positives et arrivent à éliminer le virus plus rapidement que les animaux 
non-vaccinés. Bien que les tests de séroneutralisation in vitro montrent la présence 
d‟anticorps neutralisants et protecteurs sur des cellules MDCK, ils n‟empêchent 
pas la réplication virale. Tous les oiseaux excrétaient du virus tout au long de 
l‟expérience tandis qu‟ils étaient cliniquement sains. Des études supplémentaires 
doivent être envisagées pour expliquer pourquoi les anticorps neutralisants ne 





Die vorliegende Arbeit beschreibt eine Impfstudie am Huhn bei der die 
Immunogenität und Wirksamkeit eines rekombinanten Vektorimpfstoffes 
(Modified Vaccinia Ankara, MVA) gegen Aviäre Influenza evaluiert wird. Dieser 
Vektorimpfstoff wurde mit einer künstlichen H9 Gensequenz ausgestattet, die am 
Computer errechnet worden war und sich „ancestral sequence/Vorläufersequenz“ 
nennt.   
Ziel der Immunisierung war, die Tiere damit gegen die Infektion mit einem 
Influenza A Virus des Subtyps H9N2  zu schützen. Die genetische und 
antigenetische Vielfalt von Vogelgrippeviren ist eine Herausforderung für die 
Impfstoffherstellung und die Nutzung künstlicher Antigene basierend auf 
Vorläufersequenzen daher eine neue experimentelle Möglichkeit das Wirkspektrum 
von Impfstoffen zu erweitern.    
 
Die Arbeit wurde in Zusammenarbeit der Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, 
Frankreich und der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Deutschland 
erstellt. Der genetisch veränderte Impfstoff MVA kommt aus den Laboratorien der 
Fakultät für Tiermedizin in München. Die eingefügte Sequenz stammt aus 
Toulouse, wo darüber hinaus auch geeignete Stallungen für den Impfversuch am 
Huhn vorhanden sind und diese Arbeit angefertigt wurde.  
 
Bei dem MVA Vektorimpfstoff handelt es sich um ein Pockenvirus, das dank 
seines großen Genoms und intensiver Bearbeitung über Jahrzehnte hinweg in der 
Lage ist, eine künstlich eingefügte Genesequenz abzulesen und in Form eines 
Oberflächenproteins zu präsentieren. Gegen dieses Protein bildet der Organismus 
dann Antikörper, die den Schutz gegen das Antigen vermitteln sollen. Bei der 
künstlichen Sequenz handelt es sich um eine artifizielle Hämagglutininabfolge, die 
die Charakteristika mehrerer Grippeviren in sich vereint. Hämagglutinine sind die 
wichtigsten Oberflächenproteine von Influenzaviren, unter anderem weil sich 
gegen sie die Immunantwort des Wirtes richtet.    
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Die klinische Prüfung des Impfstoffes hat gezeigt, dass geimpfte Tiere im 
Vergleich zu nicht geimpften nach einer experimentellen Infektion weniger 
histologische Veränderungen zeigen, weniger Influenza infizierte Zellen aufweisen 
und das Virus schneller eliminieren können. Vor einer Infektion schützen die 
induzierten Antikörper nicht. Im Labortest hingegen sind die gleichen Antikörper 
neutralisierend und vermitteln einen effektiven Schutz  vor in vitro Infektion mit 
Titern bis zu 1280 auf MDCK Zellenkulturen. Alle infizierten Hühner schieden 
Viren aus, wobei die große Mehrheit der Tiere während des gesamten Experiments 
klinisch gesund blieb.  
Es sind weitere Untersuchungen nötig, um erklären zu können, warum 
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14.1 Poster « Low Pathogenic Influenza (H9N2) in chicken: Evaluation of ancestral 
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14.2 Application Document for Animal Experiment to the Ethical Committee  
Low Pathogenic Influenza (H9N2) in chicken:  
Evaluation of an ancestral MVA-H9 vaccine   
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Introduction and objectives 
o   Influenza A viruses are segmented RNA viruses that show substantial genetic variability. 
     Avian influenza viruses (AIVs) can be transmitted from the waterfowl reservoir to domestic poultry or to mammals including humans. In 2013, low-pathogenic AIVs of the subtype H9N7 
     have been identified as  zoonotic pathogens and continue to  cause severe respiratory disease in humans (China).  Therefore, AIVs of H9 subtypes are considered a threat to human health.    
o   Here we portray the three fundamental steps of a new vaccine development study. A Modified Vaccina virus Ankara (MVA) poxvirus vector1,2 that expresses an ancestral hemagglutinin (HA) 
     sequence is tested for  immunogenicity and capacity to induce protection against a AIV H9 field virus in chicken.      
o    Prevention of flu in domestic birds lowers the risk of infection for humans as low pathogenic AIV H9N2 transmission among people is probably very limited6. 
  
 Structure 
Conclusion (Intermediate Step Results) 
The MVA vector vaccine reliably expressed the ancestral hemagglutinin H9 sequence and lead to a production of serum antibodies in chicken that neutralized H9N2 Avian Influenza with titers up 
to ≥ 1280 (in vitro). We observed delayed clearance of non vaccinated Group D chickens in comparison to the vaccinated animals. Given that the H9N2 Avian Influenza viruses used in this study 
caused hardly any clinical signs we can not  provide evidence on whether the vaccine is able to lower any clinical symptoms but H9N2 virus shedding was not prevented in the vaccinated chicken. 
Further studies are ongoing to understand why pre-challenge antibodies are only neutralizing in vitro and are not able to reduce viral shedding in the chicken.  
4 Ducatez MF, Bahl J, Griffin Y, Stigger-Rosser E, Franks J, Barman S, Vijaykrishna D, Webb A, Guan Y, Webster 
  RG, Smith GJ, Webby RJ: Feasibility of reconstructed ancestral h5n1 influenza viruses for cross-clade protective 
  vaccine development. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  
  2011;108:349-354.and SAMtools. Bioinformatics. 25:2078–2079. 
5  Ducatez MF, Webster RG, Webby RJ: Animal influenza epidemiology. Vaccine 2008;26 Suppl 4:D67-69. 
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 o  44 specific pathogen free (SPF) chickens were divided into four groups 
     Double Vaccinated Group A 
     Single Vaccinated Group B 
     Not Vaccinated Group D 
     Control Group C 
o      Oropharyngeal swab samples were used to obtain RNA concentrations  
      by reverse transcription real time PCR 
      Serum antibodies were used to perform hemagglutination inhibition 
      assays and microneutralization tests 
  




Infected with 500µl of 109 EID50 
3. Fig 3: HIA titers of Group B during 5 consecutive days of vaccination  Fig 4: Group average virus titers for all challenged groups form day 1 to 7 post infection. Each line represents one group. 
Fig 5: Seroneutralizing antibodies of pre-challenge sera of group A  
(double vaccinated) on MDCK cells 
 
Fig 6: Seroneutralizing antibodies of pre-challenge sera of group  B  









































Selection of the ancestral RNA sequence located at the node section of 
phylogenetic tree and insertion of synthetic cDNA into vector plasmid. 
Recombinant MVA viruses were generated by homologous recombination 
and cloned in plaque passages. 
 
Quality control for  clonal purity, genetic stability, and expression of the 
inserted synthetic H9 ancest sequence by PCR analysis of viral DNA and 
Western blot. High titer viruses purified by ultracentrifugation and 


































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 Fig 1: Post-boost, pre-challenge and post-challenge anti H9 antibody titers for Group A (double vaccinated) 
Fig 2: Pre-challenge and post-challenge anti H9 antibody titers for Group B ( Single vaccinated) 
o None of  the birds of Group  
   D (not vaccinated)   
   seroconverted pre-challenge 
  
o None of the birds of Group 
   C (not vaccinated, not    
   challenged) shed virus nor  
   seroconverted. 
 
o Birds that were vaccinated  
   twice seroconverted to higher  
   titers pre-challenge than  
   single vaccinated chickens 
 
o Virus shedding mean values 
   are simliar for birds of all  
   infected groups for 5-6 days 
   post challenge 
 
o Group A birds show higher  
   neutralizing anti H9 antibody  
   titers (in vitro, serum 

























days post infection days post infection 
  
Demande d’Autorisation de Projet utilisant des 
Animaux à des Fins Scientifiques 
 
Ce formulaire a pour objectif de rassembler les informations permettant au comité d’éthique dont 
relève l’établissement utilisateur où sera réalisé le projet utilisant des animaux à des fins 
scientifiques, d’évaluer éthiquement le projet et au Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la 
Recherche d’autoriser le projet suite à l’évaluation éthique. 
 
Le fichier de ce formulaire ainsi que la notice d’aide pour le renseigner peuvent être demandés à : 
autorisation-projet@recherche.gouv.fr  
 
Le projet est défini comme un programme de travail répondant à un objectif scientifique défini, 
utilisant un ou plusieurs modèles animaux et impliquant une ou plusieurs procédures 
expérimentales (article R-214-89 du Code rural et de la pêche maritime). 
 
 
Le formulaire renseigné sera envoyé par lettre recommandée avec accusé de réception à l’adresse 
suivante :  
Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche – Direction Générale pour la Recherche et 
l’Innovation – Secrétariat « Autorisation de projet » - 1, rue Descartes, 75231 PARIS cedex 5 
 
 
N.B. A l’exception des duplications des blocs permises et repérées par …, aucune modification 
des items de ce formulaire ne doit être effectuée. 
 
1. INFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES 
 
  
1.1. TITRE DU PROJET : 
 
Epreuve vaccinale : efficacité du Vecteur Virus MVA pour vacciner contre un virus 
influenza aviaire faiblement pathogène de sous-type H9N2. 
 
 

















2. RÉSUMÉ NON TECHNIQUE  
 
Les virus Influenza se trouvent dans le monde entier, infectant certains animaux et l'homme, avec un  
impact sur les populations qui diffère fortement selon le sous-type, la région et l'hôte. Chez la volaille, 
certains virus Influenza ne causent pas de signes cliniques alors que d'autres sont responsables de  
mortalité très élevée en l'espace de 48 heures. Dans certains élevages, on observe des pertes  
économiques importantes. 
Les virus influenza sont des virus à ARN de la famille des Orthomyxoviridae qui comprend trois 
Genres : A, B, et C. Nous allons travailler sur des virus influenza A aviaires faiblement pathogènes 
de sous-type H9N2. Les virus H9N2 faiblement pathogènes sont enzootiques en Tunisie, en Egypte, 
et dans de nombreux pays d’Asie. Ce sous-type est déjà passé à l’homme à plusieurs reprises 
(toujours sous une forme peu sévère). Le meilleur moyen à l’heure actuelle de réduire la charge 
virale dans les élevages est la vaccination. La difficulté est de vacciner avec une souche 
suffisamment proche de la souche du terrain pour s’assurer d’une réactivité croisée, sans être obligé 
de générer une nouvelle souche vaccinale pour chaque souche du terrain. 
Nous allons vacciner des poulets et des dindes avec un nouveau vaccin généré en collaboration avec 
l’Université de Munich (vaccin « MVA-H9 ancestral » décrit dans ce document) puis faire une 
épreuve de virulence pour vérifier l’efficacité du vaccin. Le virus influenza H9N2 que nous 
utiliserons pour l’épreuve virulente ne causant pas de signe clinique en conditions expérimentales, 
nous suivrons la charge virale post-infection pour déterminer l’efficacité vaccinale. Des 
prélèvements sanguins seront également effectués pour suivre la production d’anticorps au cours de 
l’expérience. Le nombre d’animaux sera au plus bas, suivant la règle des 3R, tout en s’assurant que 
nous aurons suffisamment de réplicas pour que nos données soient valables statistiquement et éviter 
de devoir répéter inutilement une expérience : 32 poulets et 32 dindes au total seront nécessaires (8 
oiseaux vaccinés 2 fois avec MVA-H9 ancestral puis infectés avec un virus H9N2 ; 8 oiseaux 
vaccinés 1 fois avec MVA-H9 ancestral puis infectés avec un virus H9N2 ; 8 oiseaux non vaccinés 
infectés avec un virus H9N2  (contrôles non vaccinés) ; 8 oiseaux non vaccinés et non infectés 
(contrôles). Les oiseaux seront hébergés sur copeaux puis en isolateurs pour volailles une fois 










3. INFORMATIONS ADMINISTRATIVES ET RÉGLEMENTAIRES 
 
3.1. L’établissement utilisateur (EU) 
 
3.1.1. Agrément de l’EU où seront utilisés les animaux : 
0. Nom : UMR INRA/ENVT 1225 « Interactions Hôtes- Agents 
Pathogènes » 
o Numéro d’agrément : C 31 555 27 
o Date de délivrance de l’agrément : 19 août 2010 
o Nom et prénom du responsable : MILON Alain 
o Adresse électronique du responsable : a.milon@envt.fr 
o Nom et prénom de la personne délégataire du responsable présente  
dans l’EU : SCHELCHER François  
o Adresse électronique de ce délégataire : f.schelcher@envt.fr 
 
 
3.1.2. Comité d’éthique agréé par le MESR dont relève l’EU : 
Sciences et santé animale (n°115) 
 
3.1.3. Responsable(s) de la mise en œuvre générale du projet dans l’EU et de sa 
conformité à l’autorisation de projet : 
Nombre de responsables :  
1 
Responsable : 
o Nom et prénom : Mariette Ducatez 
o Adresse postale (avec le nom du laboratoire) :  
UMR INRA/ENVT 1225  
23 chemin des Capelles  
31076 Toulouse Cedex 3 
o Adresse électronique : m.ducatez@envt.fr 
o Téléphone : 05 61 19 32 49 
 
3.1.4. Responsable(s) du bien-être des animaux : 
 




o Nom et prénom : Jean-Marc Delmas 
o Adresse postale (avec le nom du laboratoire) :  
UMR INRA/ENVT 1225 
23 chemin des Capelles 
31076 TOULOUSE Cedex 3 
o Adresse électronique : jm.delmas@envt.fr 
o Téléphone : 05 61 19 38 89 
 
  
 3.2. Le personnel  
 
- Compétences des personnes participant au projet :  
 
• la conception des procédures expérimentales et des projets   oui    
• l’application de procédures expérimentales aux animaux   oui   
• les soins aux animaux        oui   
• la mise à mort des animaux       oui   
 
 
3.3. Le projet  
 
3.3.1. L’objectif du projet : 
 Est-il : 
o Justifié du point de vue éducatif ?   
o Requis par la loi ?        
 Justifié du point de vue scientifique ?  
 
 Informations sur cette justification : 
   
 
La grippe aviaire est causée par un virus qui évolue très rapidement. Les virus H9N2 faiblement 
pathogènes sont enzootiques en Tunisie, en Egypte, et dans de nombreux pays d’Asie. Ce sous-type 
est déjà passé à l’homme à plusieurs reprises (toujours sous une forme peu sévère). Le meilleur 
moyen à l’heure actuelle de réduire la charge virale dans les élevages est la vaccination. La difficulté 
est de vacciner avec une souche suffisamment proche de la souche du terrain pour s’assurer d’une 
réactivité croisée, sans être obligé de générer une nouvelle souche vaccinale pour chaque souche du 
terrain. 
 
Les virus influenza faiblement pathogènes de sous-type H9N2 sont classées en de nombreux groupes 
de virus distincts sur la base de leurs séquences génétiques et de leur antigénicité : les souches 
« G1-like », « Y280-like » regroupant la plupart des virus H9N2 circulant dans les élevages aviaires 
dans le monde (SJCEIRS H9 Working Group, Emerging Microbes and Infection, 2014). En Tunisie, 
en Egypte, et dans une bonne partie de l’Asie, les souches « G1-like » dominent.  
 
Le vecteur MVA a déjà été utilisé avec succès dans des études de vaccination contre plusieurs virus 
dont le virus influenza et dans de nombreux modèles animaux (souris, furet, singe, poulet, etc). Chez 
le poulet, il a été testé une seule fois, contre un virus influenza hautement pathogène de sous-type 
H5N1 et a protégé les oiseaux lors de l’épreuve virulente (Veits et al, Vaccine, 2008).  
La stratégie de « vaccin ancestral » a été fructueuse pour protéger des furets contre 3 clades de virus 
influenza hautement pathogènes de sous-type H5N1 (Ducatez et al, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 2011).  
 
Nous voulons à présent tester l’efficacité du vecteur MVA combiné à la stratégie de vaccin 
« ancestral » pour le sous-type H9 (« G1-like ») du virus influenza. Cette approche innovante est 
prometteuse pour réduire la charge virale des souches de virus influenza H9N2. 
 
  
3.3.2. Description du projet : 
 
Le vaccin MVA-H9 ancestral est produit par nos collaborateurs à l’Institute for Infectious Diseases 
and Zoonoses Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, en Allemagne.  
La souche du terrain (wild type) faiblement pathogène qui va être utilisée pour infecter les animaux a 
été isolée en Tunisie, il s’agit de A/chicken/Tunisia/12/2010(H9N2). Nous allons travailler sur poulets 
et dindes. 
 
Quatre groupes d’oiseaux vont être utilisés. Les groupes seront constitués comme suit  
(vue d’ensemble sur le schéma de procédure expérimentale page 7) :  
 
Groupe A : vaccination double (vaccination et rappel), challenge 
Groupe B : vaccination simple (1 injection unique), challenge 
Groupe C : non vacciné, challenge 
Groupe D : non vacciné, pas de challenge  
 
La durée totale de l’expérience est de 54 jours ; elle se divise en trois phases  
(vue d’ensemble à la fin de cette section) : 
 
Phase 1 : Vaccination (à J-21) du premier groupe (A) (avec prises de sang pour tous les oiseaux avant 
la vaccination pour s’assurer de leur séronégativité)  
             
Phase 2 : Vaccination (à J0) du premier groupe (A, rappel) et du deuxième groupe (B), (avec prises 
de sang à J-1 pour suivi des anticorps post-première vaccination pour les oiseaux du groupe A et pour 
s’assurer de la séronégativité des poulets du groupe B) 
              
Phase 3: Inoculation du pathogène (J21), test de l’excrétion virale (écouvillons oropharyngés 
quotidiens de J22 à J28 et autopsies de 3 oiseaux par groupe à J24) et de la réponse immunitaire (prise 
de sang pour suivi d’anticorps à J35) 
 
Un suivi de cinétique de développement d’anticorps post-vaccination sera effectué en 2 étapes : 
d’abord avec 5 oiseaux du groupe A à J-18/-15/-12 (pour savoir si les anticorps anti-H9 apparaissent 
entre 3, 6, et 9 jours post vaccination) ; puis avec 5 oiseaux du groupe B (vaccinés 1 seule fois) pour 
affiner la cinétique avec des prélèvements quotidiens en ciblant les 3-4 jours lors desquels les 
anticorps apparaissent sur la base des prélèvements sanguins du groupe A (J3 à J6 sont indiqués sur 
le schéma expérimental ci-dessous, nous ajusterons le timing en fonction des résultats sérologiques 
du groupe A).           
Tous les animaux auront 1 jour au début de la procédure expérimentale (primo-vaccination du 
groupe A sur poussins d'1 jour) pour que le challenge ait lieu à 6 semaines conformément aux 
expériences du même type dont les résultats sont déjà publiés (Veits et al, Vaccine, 2008). 
Le vaccin sera utilisé en intra-musculaire (IM), et une dose comprendra 108 plaque forming units 
(PFU) de vaccin puisque l’efficacité d’un vaccin MVA-H5 a déjà été démontrée en IM à cette dose 
  
dans le modèle poulet par Veits et al en 2008. 
 
Tous les animaux seront hébergés en isolateurs pour volailles pour l’épreuve de virulence (groupes de 
6-8 animaux par isolateur), sauf ceux du groupe D (groupe de contrôle, pas de vaccination, pas 
d’infection) qui seront hébergés sur copeaux dans un box (dimensions de la zone avec copeaux dans 
le box : 2,5m x 3m, conformes à la directive 2010/63/EU). 
 
 
Photo d’un isolateur volaille Allentown 
 
 
Les prises de sang seront effectuées à la veine alaire (cf illustration ci-dessous). Les écouvillons 




La procédure expérimentale est schématisée ci-dessous : 
- Référence de nos isolateurs Allentown : SH12isol   
- Superficie dans un isolateur : 1,2 m2 
- Surface minimale pour des poulets  de moins de 600g 
d’après l'AM du 1er février 2013 (AGRG1238753A) : 1 m2 
(0.05 m2/poulet) ; pour les dindes et pour les poulets de 
plus de 600g, ces surfaces passent à 2 m2 minimum. 
En accord avec le personnel vétérinaire, et de par la 
courte durée de l’hébergement en isolateurs (2 
semaines, durée minimale pour une épreuve de virulence 
influenza dans le modèle aviaire), nous serons donc 
amenés à héberger les oiseaux dans des compartiments 




Nous allons travailler en animalerie de niveau 2 (A2) en respectant les mesures de biosécurité 
obligatoires en A2 afin d’éviter la contamination de l’environnement par le pathogène utilisé. Les 
manipulateurs porteront l’équipement de protection individuelle suivant : combinaison, bottes en 
caoutchouc, gants et sur-gants, masque, charlotte. Les salles dans lesquelles sont installés les 
isolateurs sont équipées de pédiluve à l’entrée pour éviter toute contamination de 
l’environnement. Enfin, les isolateurs dans lesquels seront hébergés les oiseaux infectés ont une 
pression négative, qui permet d’éviter la sortie de pathogène. 
 
3.3.3. Précisez, le cas échéant, la ou les méthodes de mise à mort prévue(s) :  
 
Anesthésie/euthanasie fixe au barbiturique (0.5 ml de Pentobarbital sodique® en intraveineuse)  
 
3.3.4. Précisez, le cas échéant, les éléments scientifiques justifiant la demande de 




3.3.5. Stratégie d’expérimentation ou d’observation et approche statistique 
utilisée afin de réduire au minimum le nombre d’animaux, la douleur, la souffrance 
et l’angoisse, infligées et l’impact environnemental, le cas échéant – si une étude 
statistique est prévue, indiquez et justifiez les tests choisis : 
 
Des données de la littérature (Tang et al, Vet Microbiol, 2014 (étude vaccinale avec des groupes de 
  
10 poulets) et Tsunekuni et al, Veterinary Immunology and Immunopathology, 2014 (étude vaccinale 
avec des groupes de 4 poulets)) ainsi qu’un test statistique (critère de jugement binaire, essai de 
différence, avec un risque alpha de 5% et une puissance de 80%) indiquent que l’on peut travailler 
sur 8 animaux vaccinés pour une étude d’efficacité de vaccin pour avoir des données nécessaires et 
suffisantes pour être valables statistiquement.  
Nous allons suivre les oiseaux quotidiennement pour repérer au plus vite tout animal qui souffrirait 
(très peu probable) et procéder à une anesthésie suivie d’une euthanasie pour limiter au minimum 
douleur, souffrance et stress. 
3.4. Les animaux 
 
3.4.1. Justifiez la nécessité d’avoir recours à des animaux pour atteindre les 
objectifs du projet : 
 
De par sa nature, et l’impact de la réponse immunitaire de l’hôte, l’étude de l’efficacité de vaccins 
MVA ne peut se faire in vitro : nous sommes obligés d’avoir recours à des animaux pour évaluer la 
protection engendrée par un vaccin contre un virus. 
 
3.4.2. Espèces animales ou types d’animaux utilisés :  
 
Souris (Mus musculus)         
Rats (Rattus norvegicus)         
Cobayes (Cavia porcellus)        
Hamsters (syriens) (Mesocricetus auratus)      
Hamsters (chinois) (Cricetulus griseus)       
Gerbilles de Mongolie (Meriones unguiculatus)     
Autres rongeurs (Rodentia)        
Lapins (Oryctolagus cuniculus)        
Chats (Felis catus)          
Chiens (Canis familiaris)         
Furets (Mustela putorius furo)        
Autres carnivores (carnivora)        
Chevaux, ânes et croisements (Equidae)      
Porcs (Sus scrofa domesticus)        
Caprins (Capra aegagrus hircus)        
  
Ovins (Ovis aries)          
Bovins (Bos primigenius)         
Prosimiens (prosimia)         
Ouistitis et tamarins (par exemple, Callithrix jacchus)     
Singe cynomolgus (Macaca fascicularis)      
Singe rhésus (Macaca mulatta)        
Vervets chlorocebus spp. (généralement soit pygerythrus, soit sabaeus)  
Babouins (Papio spp.)         
Saïmiris (par exemple, Saimiri sciureus)      
Autres espèces de primates non humains (autres espèces de Ceboidea  
et Cercopithecoidea)         
Singes anthropoïdes (Hominoidea)       
Autres mammifères (autres Mammalia)       
Poules domestiques (Gallus gallus domesticus)     
Autres oiseaux (autres Aves)        
Reptiles (Reptilia)          
Grenouilles Rana (Rana temporaria et Rana pipiens)     
Grenouilles Xenopus (Xenopus laevis et Xenopus tropicalis)   
Autres amphibiens (autres Amphibia)       
Poissons zèbres (Danio rerio)        
Autres poissons (autres Pisces)        
Céphalopodes (Cephalopoda)        
 
Espèces : poulet et dinde      
 
3.4.3. Justifiez la pertinence de l’(des) espèce(s) animale(s) choisie(s) : 
 
Le projet nécessite l'utilisation de l’hôte naturel du pathogène étudié : le poulet et la dinde 
 
  
3.4.4. S’agit-il de spécimens d’espèces menacées énumérées à l’annexe A du 
règlement (CE) n° 338/97 du Conseil du 9 décembre 1996 relatif à la protection des 
espèces de faune et de flore sauvages par le contrôle et leur commerce ?  
           non 
 
Si oui, éléments scientifiques démontrant que la finalité de la procédure 
expérimentale ne peut être atteinte en utilisant d’autres espèces que celles 
énumérées dans cette annexe : 
 
 
3.4.5. S’agit-il de spécimens de primates non humains ?   non 
Si oui, éléments scientifiques démontrant que la finalité de la procédure 





3.4.6. S’agit-il d’animaux capturés dans la nature ?    non 
Si oui, éléments scientifiques démontrant que la finalité de la procédure 
expérimentale ne peut être atteinte en utilisant d’autres animaux que ceux  




3.4.7. S’agit-il d’animaux d’espèces domestiques, errantes ou vivantes à l’état 
sauvage ?                non 
Si oui, éléments scientifiques démontrant que la finalité de la procédure 




3.4.8. Catégorie des animaux utilisés dans le projet :  
 
Animaux tenus en captivité (domestiques ou non domestiques)   
Animaux non domestiques non tenus en captivité     
Animaux génétiquement altérés       
o Animaux non domestiques non tenus en captivité 
• Si les animaux utilisés sont des spécimens d’espèces protégées en 
application de l’article L. 411-1 du Code de l’environnement, indiquez 
les références de la dérogation accordée pour effectuer la capture 
des animaux dans le milieu naturel (4° de l’article L. 411-2 du Code de 
l’environnement) : 
 
• Si les animaux utilisés sont des spécimens d’espèces dont la chasse 
  
est autorisée, indiquez ici les références de l’autorisation de 
prélèvement accordée pour effectuer la capture des animaux dans le 
milieu naturel (article L. 424-11 du Code de l’environnement) : 
 
 
• Justification scientifique montrant que l’objectif de la procédure 
expérimentale ne peut être atteint en utilisant un animal élevé en vue 
d’une utilisation dans des procédures expérimentales : 
 
 
o Animaux génétiquement altérés 
Animaux génétiquement modifiés    non 
Si oui : 
 Création d’une lignée       oui non 
Maintien d’une lignée établie et/ou utilisation  oui non  
 Phénotype non dommageable     oui non 
 Phénotype dommageable     oui non  
Souche mutante autre      oui non 
Si oui : 
      Création d’un mutant      oui non      
Maintien d’une lignée établie et/ou utilisation   oui non 
       Phénotype non dommageable     oui non 
       Phénotype dommageable      oui non  
3.4.9. Origine des animaux tenus en captivité : 
o Les animaux destinés à être utilisés dans les procédures expérimentales 
appartenant aux espèces dont la liste est fixée réglementairement sont-ils 
élevés à cette fin et proviennent-ils d’éleveurs ou de fournisseurs agréés ? 
 oui et en cours 
• Si oui, nombre d’établissements éleveur ou fournisseur agréés 




• Nom : 
 
PFIE - Centre Val de Loire - INRA  
 
• Adresse postale : 
 









• Si non, justifier scientifiquement l’utilisation d’animaux qui ne 
proviennent pas d’éleveurs ou de fournisseurs agréés : 
 
Il n’existe pas d’éleveur ou fournisseur agréé de dindes. Nous travaillons en collaboration avec le groupe 
Grelier en Vendée qui nous fournira les dindes nécessaires aux expériences. Nous avons lancé la 
procédure de certification du groupe Grelier. 
 
o Votre propre établissement utilisateur fournit-il tout ou partie des animaux 
du projet ?          non 
 
o Un autre établissement utilisateur fournit-il tout ou partie des animaux du 
projet ?            non  
 
 Nombre d’établissements éleveur occasionnel non agréés fournissant tout 







• Nom : 
Grelier 
• Adresse postale : 
La Bohardière - BP1 
49290 St-Laurent de la Plaine 
• Animaux fournis : 
dindes de statut sanitaire sain 
 
 Nombre d’établissements éleveur ou fournisseur localisés dans des Etats 





Etablissement :  




 Nombre d’établissements éleveur ou fournisseur localisés dans des pays 





Etablissement :  




o Les animaux sont-ils des animaux réutilisés d’un projet précédent ?   
            non 
Si oui, veuillez compléter le chapitre 4.3 de ce formulaire. 
 
3.4.10. Nombre estimé d’animaux utilisés dans le projet :  
 
Nous utiliserons au total 32 poulets et 32 dindes  
 
 Justification de ce nombre pour chacune des espèces animales utilisées : 
 
Les données de la littérature ainsi qu’un test statistique (critère de jugement binaire, essai de différence, 
avec un risque alpha de 5% et une puissance de 80%) indiquent que on peut travailler sur 8 animaux par 
expérience/groupe pour avoir des données nécessaires et suffisantes pour être valables statistiquement. 
Pour réduire le nombre d’animaux utilisés, nous avons décidé de n’utiliser que six animaux pour les 
groupes non-vaccinés (C et D) puisque nous avons des données préliminaires (infections avec le même 
virus influenza H9N2 dans le cadre du projet MODELAFLU). 
 
3.4.11. Indiquez à quel(s) stade(s) de développement les animaux seront utilisés et 
le justifier : 
 
Sur la base de publications décrivant des essais vaccinaux chez le modèle aviaire, nous allons utiliser des 
poulets et des dindes de 1 jour (à J-21).  
 
3.4.12. Indiquez le sexe des animaux utilisés et le justifier : 
 
Mâles et femelles (le sex ratio est subi (nous sommes dépendants de la disponibilité des oiseaux en 
élevages sains) mais à l’heure actuelle aucune différence entre mâles et femelles n’ayant été observée, 
ceci nous importe peu). 
 
3.4.13. Indiquez pour chaque espèce les points limites adaptés, suffisamment 
prédictifs et précoces pour permettre de limiter la douleur à son minimum, sans 
remettre en cause les résultats du projet : 
 
Les données de terrain et nos expériences préliminaires montrent que les poulets vaccinés ne devraient 
pas avoir de signes cliniques. Même si improbables, tout signe clinique d’apathie, d’arrêt de prise 
d’aliment, ou de détresse respiratoire, constitueraient des points limites chez le poulet et la dinde et 
seraient suivis d’anesthésie/euthanasie.  
 
 
4. LES PROCÉDURES EXPÉRIMENTALES 
  
 
4.1 Objet(s) visés par les procédures expérimentales 
 
A - La recherche fondamentale.          
 
B - Les recherches transactionnelles ou appliquées menées pour : 
- la prévention, la prophylaxie, le diagnostic ou le traitement de maladies, de mauvais 
états de santé ou d’autres anomalies ou de leurs effets chez l’homme, les animaux ou 
les plantes ; 
- l’évaluation, la détection, le contrôle ou les modifications des conditions physiologiques 
chez l’homme, les animaux ou les plantes ; 
- le bien-être des animaux et l’amélioration des conditions de production des animaux 
élevés à des fins agronomiques.         
 
C - L’une des finalités visées au point précédent (B) lors de la mise au point, de la 
production ou des essais de qualité, d’efficacité et d’innocuité de médicaments à usage 
humain ou vétérinaire, de denrées alimentaires, d’aliments pour animaux et d’autres 
substances ou produits.           
 
D - La protection de l’environnement naturel dans l’intérêt de la santé ou du bien-être de 
l’homme ou de l’animal.          
 
E- La recherche en vue de la conservation des espèces.     
 
F- L’enseignement supérieur, ou la formation professionnelle ou technique conduisant à 
des métiers qui comportent la réalisation de procédures expérimentales sur des 
animaux ou les soins et l’entretien de ces animaux, ainsi que la formation 
professionnelle continue dans ce domaine.        
 
G - Les enquêtes médico-légales.        
        
  
 
4.2 Nombre de procédures expérimentales : 
 
1 
4.2.1 NOM DE LA PROCÉDURE EXPÉRIMENTALE N° 1 :  
  
épreuve virulente du vaccin recombinant MVA-H9 ancestral contre une souche tunisienne de virus 
influenza faiblement pathogène H9N2.  
 
- PROPOSITION DE CLASSIFICATION DE LA PROCÉDURE SELON LE DEGRÉ DE 
SÉVÉRITE (conformément à l’annexe de l’arrêté relatif à l’autorisation de projet) : 
 classe légère 
 classe modérée 
 classe sévère 
 classe sans réveil 
- Description détaillée de la procédure expérimentale : 
• Pertinence et justification de la procédure expérimentale :  
 
L’expérience porte sur l’efficacité d’un vaccin MVA-H9 ancestral chez le poulet et la dinde. Bien que le 
vecteur exprime les gènes recombinants in vitro, il est absolument nécessaire d’avoir un modèle in vivo 
pour s’assurer que le vecteur n’interfère pas avec d’autres composants de l’organisme. A la fin de la 
procédure on saura si on est capable d’éviter une infection avec la souche 
A/chicken/Tunisia/10/2012(H9N2), que l’on trouve réellement sur le terrain.  
• Indiquez le nombre de lots et le nombre d’animaux par lots, et les justifier : 
 
32 oiseaux au total par expérience, quatre lots (quatre lots de 8 oiseaux) (32 poulets et 32 dindes au total) 
 
 - Indiquez le cas échéant le prélèvement, ainsi que la fréquence et le(s) 
volume(s) prélevés : 
 
Prélèvement Fréquence et volume prélevé Animaux et Date (jours post 
infection) 
Prise de sang pour suivi 
sérologique 
1 ml, 2 à 7 fois (suivi d’anticorps pour 
comprendre la cinétique de 
développement des anticorps post 
vaccination et post challenge)  
Groupe A : J-22/J-18 /J-15 
/J-12 /J-1/J20 et J35 
Groupe B : J-1, J3 /J4 /J5 /J6, J20 et 
J35  
Groupes C et D : J-20, J35 
Ecouvillon oropharyngé une fois par jour et par animal Groupes A, B et C : J22 -J28 
Autopsie  Une fois sur 3 animaux par groupe, 
fragment de trachée et de poumon 
prélevés sur chaque animal 
Groupes A, B et C : J24 
 
- Indiquez le cas échéant les méthodes pour réduire ou supprimer la 
douleur, la souffrance et l’angoisse (liste des médications - anesthésiques, 
  
analgésiques, anti-inflammatoires…en précisant les doses, voies, durées et 
fréquences d’administration), y compris le raffinement des conditions 
d’hébergement, d’élevage et de soins : 
 
Les oiseaux seront hébergés en isolateurs pour volailles, respectivement sur des copeaux, et 
anesthésiés/euthanasiés pour limiter la douleur à son minimum en cas de signes cliniques importants 
(décrits en 3.4.13) avant la fin de l’expérience. Nous allons accrocher des CDs dans les isolateurs (sur des 
fils accrochés au plafond de l’isolateur, référence travaux ITAVI) pour enrichir l’environnement. 
 
- Indiquez le cas échéant les dispositions prises en vue de réduire, d’éviter 
et d’atténuer toute forme de souffrance des animaux de la naissance à la mort : 
 
Les oiseaux seront hébergés en isolateurs pour volailles, respectivement sur des copeaux, et 
anesthésiés/euthanasiés pour limiter la douleur à son minimum en cas de signes cliniques importants 
(décrits en 3.4.13) avant la fin de l’expérience. 
 
- Indiquez le cas échéant les raisons scientifiques justifiant une dérogation à 




- Indiquez le cas échéant les raisons scientifiques justifiant une dérogation 




- Dispositions prises pour éviter tout double emploi injustifié des procédures 
expérimentales, le cas échéant :  
 
NA 
- Devenir des animaux à la fin de cette procédure expérimentale : 
 o mise à mort ?        




o animal gardé en vie ?       
précisez les animaux concernés et si la décision a été prise par le vétérinaire 




o placement ou mise en liberté des animaux ?    






4.3. Si le projet utilise des animaux réutilisés d’un projet antérieur :         NON 
 





Précisez les éléments scientifiques justifiant la demande de dérogation pour 
autant que les animaux n’aient pas été utilisés plus d’une fois dans une 
procédure expérimentale entrainant une douleur intense, de l’angoisse ou une 
souffrance équivalente : 
 
 
- Effet cumulatif de cette réutilisation sur les animaux :  
 
 
- L’avis vétérinaire est-il favorable en prenant en considération le sort de l’animal 
concerné sur toute sa durée de vie ?    oui  non 
 
- L’animal réutilisé a-t-il pleinement recouvré son état de santé et de bien-être 
général ?        oui  non 
 
4.4. Cas particulier des projets contenant une procédure expérimentale impliquant 
une douleur,  une angoisse ou une souffrance sévère et susceptible de se 
prolonger sans qu’il soit possible de les soulager 
 




• Justifiez scientifiquement les raisons à l’origine d’une demande de dérogation :  
 
 
 
